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Abstract
We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a
consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the
model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how
this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking
contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real
trade agreements.
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(SES-0518802).1. Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) regulation of trade in goods — the General Agreement
on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) — is obviously a highly incomplete contract. And while the
GATT/WTO is the most central trade agreement in the world trading system, this characteri-
zation applies as well to every other entry in the vast catalogue of existing trade agreements. A
sizeable economics literature examines various aspects of this incompleteness. The typical ap-
proach is to impose exogenous restrictions on the set of policy instruments that can be included
in a trade agreement, and examine what the agreement can accomplish given these limitations.1
This literature has advanced our understanding of the consequences of the incompleteness of
trade agreements, but it cannot explain the particular forms that the incompleteness has taken,
because the incompleteness is assumed rather than endogenously derived.
The broad purpose of this paper is to take the analysis of trade agreements as incomplete
contracts one step further, by endogenously determining the choice of contract form. A more
speciﬁc purpose is to demonstrate that an incomplete contracting perspective can help to shed
light on core features of the GATT/WTO, including:
1. The agreement binds the levels of trade instruments. In contrast, domestic instruments
are largely left to the discretion of governments, with two important exceptions: ﬁrst, internal
policies have to respect the National Treatment clause; and second, the WTO has introduced
a regulation of domestic subsidies.
2. The bindings are largely rigid (i.e. not state-contingent). But there are “escape clauses”
that allow countries to unilaterally impose temporary protection (GATT Art. XIX) or to
renegotiate bindings (GATT Art. XXVIII).
3. The bindings only stipulate upper bounds on the tariﬀs that can be applied, thus leaving
governments with discretion to go below the bounds.
An important aspect of the incompleteness of the GATT/WTO, which is embodied in the
a b o v ef e a t u r e sb u ta l s or e ﬂected to varying degrees in other trade agreements, is that the agree-
ment displays an interesting combination of rigidity, in the sense that contractual obligations
are largely insensitive to changes in economic (and political) conditions, and discretion,i nt h e
sense that governments have substantial leeway in the setting of many policies.
1An incomplete list of papers that fall into this category is Copeland (1990), Bagwell and Staiger (2001),
Battigalli and Maggi (2003), Costinot (2004) and Horn (2006).
1In this paper we propose a simple theoretical framework where the incompleteness of the
agreement, and in particular the ways and degrees in which discretion and rigidity are present
in the agreement, is determined endogenously. This approach, we believe, can help explain why
the regulation of goods trade in the GATT/WTO has been structured along the lines described
above. And while in this paper we take the GATT/WTO as our institutional focus, we believe
that the framework and results we develop here can contribute as well to an understanding of
the forms taken by contractual incompleteness in trade agreements more generally.
The analytical starting point of the paper is the notion that governments face two funda-
mental sources of diﬃculty when designing a trade agreement. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h e r ei sawide
array of policy instruments — border measures and especially internal “domestic” measures —
that must be constrained to keep in check the governments’ incentives to act opportunisti-
cally. This feature suggests that the agreement should be comprehensive in its coverage of
trade-relevant policies. The second source of diﬃculty is that there is signiﬁcant uncertainty
concerning the circumstances that will prevail during the life-time of the agreement. This fea-
ture suggests that the agreement should be highly adaptable to the contingencies that unfold.
Of course these features would not pose a problem if contracting were costless. But in reality
there are important costs associated with forming a trade agreement. While these costs can take
a variety of forms, it is likely that they are higher when the agreement is more detailed, both in
terms of the number of policies that it seeks to constrain and the number of contingencies that
it speciﬁes. We explicitly incorporate the costs of contracting over policies and contingencies
into an analysis of the optimal structure of a trade agreement.
An objection might be raised that, when it comes to trade agreements, the costs of con-
tracting are likely to be small while the gains from an agreement are likely to be quite large,
and so the costs of contracting are unlikely to have important eﬀects on the structure of trade
agreements. But it should be kept in mind that these costs include in principle the cost of
negotiation delays, the cost of lawyers, the cost of dispute panels, and the like, and that in
reality these costs must be multiplied by a vast number of products, countries, policy instru-
ments, and contingencies. Indeed, the WTO Agreement, which by all accounts is considered
to be an extremely incomplete agreement, still ﬁlls some 24,000 pages, and it took approxi-
mately 8 years of negotiations to complete. To take just one illustrative example, what might
seem on its surface to be a relatively straightforward task of ﬁnding a workable agreement to
limit the use of subsidies has preoccupied member governments of the GATT/WTO for over
250 years, and a concise deﬁnition of exactly what is meant by a “subsidy” continues to elude
negotiators. Hence, we believe that it is reasonable to view the contracting costs associated
w i t ht r a d ea g r e e m e n t sa ss i g n i ﬁcant even relative to the potential beneﬁts of the agreement,
and that these costs are then likely to shape the nature of the agreement that is negotiated.2
We work within a competitive two-country setting, where countries may experience a con-
sumption externality. The role of this externality is to provide an eﬃciency rationale for policy
intervention. As we explain in more detail in a later section, the model would generate simi-
lar insights if, instead of a consumption externality, we considered a production externality or
introduced political-economy motives in the governments’ objectives. What is essential is the
presence of an (economic or political) eﬃciency rationale for policy intervention.
For simplicity we focus on intervention in import sectors, and assume that governments have
access to a rich set of taxation instruments, namely: import tariﬀs, distinct consumption taxes
on domestically-produced goods and on imported goods, and production subsidies. Uncertainty
plays a central role. To bring out the main points, we focus for much of our analysis on one-
dimensional uncertainty, and we contrast two cases: one in which the source of the uncertainty
is the level of the externality, and one in which it is the underlying level of import demand.
We later consider how the insights derived in the settings with one-dimensional uncertainty
generalize to a setting of multidimensional uncertainty.
We formalize the notion of contracting costs in a simple way. Following an approach similar
to that of Battigalli and Maggi (2002), we assume that these costs are increasing in the number
of state variables and policies included in the agreement, and we characterize the agreement
that maximizes expected global welfare minus contracting costs (the “optimal” agreement).
The ﬁrst step of our analysis is to examine two benchmark scenarios: one is the no-agreement
outcome — that is the noncooperative equilibrium — and the other is the ﬁrst-best outcome.
In the absence of an agreement, the importing country would use its policy instruments to
2The diﬃculties associated with writing an agreement that is comprehensive in policy coverage and is highly
contingent have been emphasized in the trade-law literature. For example, Robert Hudec (1990) writes: “...The
standard trade policy rules could deal with the common type of trade policy measure governments usually
employ to control trade. But trade can also be aﬀected by other “domestic” measures, such as product safety
standards, having nothing to do with trade policy. It would have been next to impossible to catalogue all such
possibilities in advance” (p. 24). Also, Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes (2001) write: “...Many contracts are
negotiated under conditions of considerable complexity and uncertainty, and it is not economical for the parties
to specify in advance how they ought to behave under every conceivable contingency ... The parties to trade
agreements, like the parties to private contracts, enter the bargain under conditions of uncertainty. Economic
conditions may change, the strength of interest group organization may change, and so on” (pp. 181-4).
3manipulate the terms of trade in standard fashion. This of course would lead to a globally
ineﬃcient outcome, and hence there is scope for an agreement to restrain governments from
behaving opportunistically. Were it not for the consumption externality, the ﬁr s tb e s ta g r e e m e n t
would be very simple: it would just stipulate laissez-faire across all policy instruments and under
all circumstances. But due to the externality, the contracting problem is substantially more
complex: the ﬁrst best agreement will now involve the use of policy instruments, and it will
require these policies to be state-contingent if the externality is uncertain.
As a result of contracting costs, the governments may ﬁnd it worthwhile to write an agree-
ment that is simpler than the ﬁrst best agreement. As we hinted above, there are two essential
ways to save on contracting costs: one is to make the agreement (partially or fully) rigid, and
the other is to leave some of the policies to the discretion of governments. The key part of our
analysis hence consists of examining the optimal degrees of rigidity and discretion in the trade
agreement, and how these depend on contracting costs and features of the underlying economy.
Our ﬁrst result is that the optimal agreement tends to leave more discretion on domestic
policy instruments than on import taxes. This result accords well with the traditional emphasis
on border measures over domestic instruments that characterizes the GATT/WTO; moreover,
while this feature is often explained informally as deriving from distinct levels of contracting
costs that reﬂect diﬀerences in transparency across these instruments, our model imposes no
such distinction, and so it identiﬁes in this respect a more fundamental explanation.
Next we characterize the optimal agreement and how it varies with contracting costs. As
contracting costs increase from zero, the optimal agreement is initially complete, then it be-
comes increasingly rigid and/or discretionary, and eventually it becomes optimal to have no
agreement at all. Whether the optimal agreement tends to feature rigidity or discretion, or a
combination of the two, depends crucially on demand and supply conditions and on the source
and magnitude of uncertainty. Intuitively, rigidity is relatively more attractive when uncer-
tainty is small. Discretion (over domestic instruments) is relatively more attractive when (i)
domestic instruments are less eﬀective at manipulating terms of trade, or in other words, the
degree of substitutability between these instruments and import taxes is lower, since in this case
the ability to manipulate terms of trade through domestic instruments is lower; and (ii) the
importing country has less monopoly power i nt r a d e ,s i n c ei nt h i sc a s et h eincentive to distort
terms of trade through domestic instruments is lower.
As a consequence of the monopoly-power eﬀect, the model predicts that the optimal degree
4of discretion is lower if the import demand level, and hence the volume of trade, is higher,
because the incentive to distort domestic instruments for manipulating the terms of trade is
then stronger. This in turn suggests a possible explanation for the fact that the WTO has
introduced a regulation of domestic subsidies that was not present in GATT: broadly speaking,
the explanation is that a general increase in trade volumes over time has increased the cost of
discretion, thereby heightening the need to constrain domestic policies. And in combination
with the instrument-substitutability eﬀect, the model also suggests a reason why developing
countries may have been largely exempted from the WTO regulation of domestic subsidies
through “special and diﬀerential treatment” clauses: the typical developing country may lack
both the size in world markets to wield substantial market power and the rich array of domestic
policy instruments necessary to ﬁnd easy substitutes for tariﬀs.
The role of uncertainty in shaping the optimal agreement depends in subtle ways on its
source. This can be traced to a key observation: in our contracting environment, rigidity and
discretion interact, and they do so in diﬀerent ways depending on the source of the uncertainty.
In particular, when uncertainty involves the level of the consumption externality — or more
generally state variables that are directly relevant for the ﬁrst-best levels of domestic policy
instruments — rigidity and discretion are complementary ways of saving on contracting costs,
in the sense that the cost of rigidity is lower when the agreement features discretion. The
intuition for this result is that introducing discretion (over domestic instruments) into a rigid
agreement is a way to achieve indirect state-contingency: with discretion, the unilateral setting
of domestic instruments varies in the “right” way with the level of the externality; and for this
reason, introducing discretion mitigates the cost of rigidity.
On the other hand, when uncertainty involves the level of import demand — or more generally
state variables that are not directly relevant for the ﬁrst-best levels of import taxes — rigidity
a n dd i s c r e t i o na r esubstitutes, meaning that the cost of rigidity is higher when the agreement
features discretion (over domestic instruments). The intuition is that in this case rigidity
diminishes the ability of the agreement to provide indirect incentive management:a sw eh a v e
observed above, the incentive to distort domestic instruments for manipulating the terms of
trade is stronger when the import demand level is higher, and so allowing higher import taxes in
the high-import-demand states can be valuable as a way to mitigate this incentive, something
that rigidity precludes.
Thus, the indirect state-contingency eﬀect tends to make rigidity and discretion comple-
5mentary, while the indirect incentive-management eﬀect tends to make rigidity and discretion
substitutes. With the aid of these eﬀe c t s ,w ea r ea b l et od e s c r i b eh o wt h es o u r c eo fu n c e r t a i n t y
— consumption externality, import demand level, and in a later section production external-
ity/political economy motive — determines whether rigidity and discretion are complements or
rather substitutes in a given environment, and how this shapes the optimal agreement.
Of special interest is our ﬁnding that, when there is substantial uncertainty about the level
o fi m p o r td e m a n d ,i tm a yb eo p t i m a lf o rt h ea g r e e m e n tt os p e c i f ya ne s c a p e - c l a u s et y p er u l e ,
whereby governments are allowed to raise tariﬀs when the level of import demand is higher.
Our rationale for an escape clause is distinct from those that have been highlighted in the
existing theoretical literature.3 In particular, an escape clause can be appealing in our model
due precisely to the indirect incentive management eﬀect, that is, as a way to manage the
higher incentives to distort domestic instruments for terms of trade purposes in periods of high
underlying import volume.
In the ﬁnal part of the paper we extend the analysis to shed light on two other core aspects
of the GATT/WTO: the presence of a National Treatment (NT) rule for internal taxes, and
t h ef a c tt h a tt a r i ﬀs are constrained by “weak” bindings (i.e. upper bounds) rather than by
“strong” bindings (i.e. exact levels).
We evaluate the NT clause as a possible means of saving on contracting costs. We interpret
the NT rule as requiring equal internal taxation of the imported and the domestically produced
good. We show that there is only one type of NT-based agreement that can be strictly optimal
in our setting: this is an agreement that imposes the NT rule and ties down the import tariﬀ
and the production subsidy, but leaves the (common) consumption tax to the governments’
discretion. We identify a simple set of conditions under which this type of agreement is indeed
optimal. The key condition concerns the degree of substitutability between the consumption
tax and the tariﬀ for the purposes of manipulating terms of trade: if this degree is suﬃciently
low (which is the case when demand is more rigid and supply is more elastic), and if the level of
contracting costs lies in an intermediate range, then an NT-based agreement is strictly optimal.
Finally, we argue that the presence of contracting costs may explain why GATT stipulates
weak bindings rather than strong bindings. More speciﬁcally, we show that the optimal agree-
ment may include rigid weak bindings. This type of binding combines rigidity and discretion,
3An escape clause could be motivated for distributional reasons if the government lacked better instruments
with which to redistribute income. Bagwell and Staiger (1990) show that an escape clause can be motivated for
enforcement purposes when trade agreements lack external enforcement mechanisms.
6since the ceiling does not depend on the state of the world, and the government has discretion
to set the policy below the ceiling. This ﬁnding strengthens the insight — highlighted above —
that rigidity and discretion may be complementary ways to economize on contracting costs.
The paper is structured in the following way: in section 2 we lay out the basic model and
derive the two benchmarks of no-agreement outcome and ﬁrst-best outcome; in section 3 we
characterize the optimal agreement; in section 4 we examine the role of the NT clause; in section
5 we examine the role of weak bindings; in section 6 we discuss the case of production external-
ities and that of political-economy motives in the governments’ objectives; in the Conclusion
we discuss a number of simplifying assumptions made in the model and suggest directions for
further research; the Appendix provides proofs that are not contained in the body of the paper.
2. The Model
We consider a perfectly competitive world with two countries, Home and Foreign. There are
three goods, a numeraire good and two non-numeraire goods (which we label 1 and 2). Home
is a natural importer of good 1 and Foreign a natural importer of good 2.
We start by describing the supply structure in the Home country. The numeraire good
is produced one-for-one from labor. The supply of labor is large enough that this good is
always produced in positive amount; therefore the equilibrium wage is equal to one. Each non-
numeraire good is produced from labor with diminishing returns. In particular, we assume the




where Xj is the production of good j and Lj is the labor employed in the production of good
j. This supply structure is convenient because it implies linear supply functions. In particular,
if qj denotes the producer price for good j, the supply function for good j is
Xj(qj)=λjqj,j =1 ,2.
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7The representative citizen’s utility function is linear in the numeraire good and separable
in the non-numeraire goods. Also, to create an eﬃciency rationale for policy intervention, we
allow for the possibility of a (negative) consumption externality. As we argue in section 6, the
main qualitative results of the model would be the same if we had a production externality, or
if we had political-economy motives in the governments’ objectives. What is important is the
existence of an (economic or political) eﬃciency rationale for policy intervention.
We assume that the externality is linear in aggregate domestic consumption and does not
cross borders. Hence, we model the consumption externality as a purely domestic “eyesore”
pollutant, along the lines of Markusen (1975) and especially Ederington (2001). Also, we assume
that good 1 generates an externality only in Home, and good 2 only in Foreign.4
Formally, we are assuming the following utility functions for the two countries:


















where cj and Cj denote respectively individual and aggregate consumption of good j.T h e
parameters γ1 and γ∗
2 capture the strength of the externalities in the two countries. Each
consumer ignores the eﬀect of her individual consumption on aggregate consumption, so the
externalities do not aﬀect demand functions. We assume that the sub-utility functions are












where pj and p∗
j denote consumer prices. All parameters introduced thus far are positive.
Assuming that the population in each country is a continuum of measure one, we can write
the consumer surplus associated with good j in Home and Foreign respectively as:

















We assume that each government can intervene only in its import sector, but within this
sector we allow each government to use a rich set of taxation instruments, namely: an import
tariﬀ (τ), an internal tax on consumption of the domestically produced good (th), an internal
4We could relax this assumption and allow each good to have externalities in both countries, but this would
only complicate the analysis without adding to the insights of the model. Notice also that, if one considers
political-economy motives (as in section 6) instead of consumption externalities, such an asymmetric structure
would capture situations where import-competing interests are organized but export interests are not.
8tax on consumption of the imported good (tf), and a production subsidy to domestic ﬁrms
(s). All instruments are expressed in speciﬁc terms. The reason we allow for this rich set of
policies is twofold. First, we want to represent a situation in which governments can use a
variety of instruments to act opportunistically and manipulate terms of trade, so that there is
an interesting trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of contracting over many policies and the costs of
doing so. And second, we consider in a later section an NT rule that constrains the relationship
between taxes on the consumption of domestically-produced and imported goods. Evaluating
the merits of such a rule requires that we start with separate consumption taxes th and tf.
At this point we impose a strong symmetric structure on the model: we assume that the
two non-numeraire sectors are mirror-images of each other. This allows us to focus on a single
sector and drop subscripts from now on. We focus on sector 1, where Home is the natural
importer, but the reader should keep in mind that in the background there is a mirror-image
sector with identical equilibrium conditions, except that the two countries’ roles are reversed.
The symmetry of the model is inessential, and could be relaxed at the cost of extra notation.
Throughout the paper we focus on non-prohibitive levels of government intervention. In the
sector under consideration, due to the absence of taxation by the foreign government, Foreign
producer and consumer prices are equalized, or q∗ = p∗. In addition, for a foreign ﬁrm to sell
in both countries, it must receive the same price for sales in the foreign-country that it receives
after taxes for sales in the home-country p∗ = p−τ −tf.A n dﬁnally, the relationship between
the Home producer price and the Home consumer price is given by q = p − th + s.
We can express the above pricing relationships in more compact form as
p = p
∗ + T,a n d ( 2 . 1 )
q = p
∗ + T + S,
where T ≡ τ + tf and S ≡ s −th. The arbitrage relationships in (2.1) describe the two central
price wedges in the model; the ﬁr s ti st h ew e d g eb e t w e e nt h eH o m ec o n s u m e rp r i c ea n dt h e
Foreign price (equal to T), and the second is the wedge between the Home producer price and
the Foreign price (equal to T +S). Note that τ and tf are perfectly substitutable policies (only
their sum matters), and the same is true for s and th (only their diﬀerence matters). Thus,
while it is appropriate to refer to τ as a “border measure” and to tf, th and s as “internal
measures,” we will also sometimes refer to T as the total tax on imports, or simply as the
“import tax,” and to S as the “eﬀective production subsidy” or the set of “domestic policies.”






The market clearing condition (2.2), together with the two arbitrage relationships in (2.1),
yields expressions for the three market clearing prices as functions of T and S:
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∗ − (β + λ)T − λS]/Υ,
where Υ ≡ λ + λ
∗ + β + β
∗. At the market clearing prices, home import volume, M,i se q u a l










Note that M(T =0 ,S=0 )> 0, and hence the home country is a natural importer of the








We will henceforth assume that (2.3) holds.
We assume that each government maximizes the welfare of its representative citizen. Since
the welfare function is separable across sectors, we can focus again on sector 1. In this sector,
Home welfare can be written as the sum of consumer surplus, proﬁts, net revenue (i.e. revenue
from the import tax T m i n u se x p e n d i t u r e so nt h ee ﬀective production subsidy S), and the
valuation of the externality:
W(T,S) ≡ CS(T,S)+Π(T,S)+T · M(T,S) − S · X(T,S) − γD(T,S),
where the notation emphasizes the dependence of each component of welfare on policies. Re-
calling that in the sector under consideration the Foreign country has no externality and no





102.1. The noncooperative equilibrium and the eﬃcient policies
We ﬁrst derive the noncooperative equilibrium policies, which we take to represent the choices
made in the absence of international agreements. With the foreign government passive (in the































The ﬁrst condition deﬁnes the optimal unilateral choice of T given S, which we denote TR(S),
and the second condition deﬁnes the optimal unilateral choice of S given T, denoted SR(T).
From the above system we may derive the home government’s noncooperative equilibrium
policies, which we denote by TN and SN:
T









where η∗ is the elasticity of the foreign export supply (itself evaluated at SN and TN).6
Recalling that T ≡ τ + tf and S ≡ s − th, there are many equivalent policy combinations
that correspond to the unilateral policy choices TN and SN. One of these combinations is
{τ =
p∗
η∗,t h = tf = γ,s =0 }, making it transparent that in the noncooperative equilibrium
the home country sets its traditional (Johnson, 1953-54) “optimal tariﬀ” — the inverse of the
foreign export supply elasticity — to exploit its monopoly power over the terms of trade (p∗)a n d
applies a uniform Pigouvian consumption tax equal to the consumption externality. It is direct
to verify that our focus on non-prohibitive levels of government intervention in eﬀect places an
upper limit on the magnitude of the externality parameter γ.
Next we turn to the globally eﬃcient policies, which we deﬁne as the policies that maximize




5We use interchangeably the words “noncooperative” and “unilateral.”
6It is not hard to verify that W is jointly concave in (T,S), which ensures that the ﬁrst-order conditions are
suﬃcient. For completeness we report here the explicit expression for TN: TN =
(β∗+λ∗)[α+Υγ+λγ]−(β+λ)α∗
(β∗+λ∗)[Υ+(β+λ)] .
7In our symmetric setting, it is natural to deﬁne eﬃciency in this way. Recall that there is another sector that
mirrors exactly the one under consideration, and in which Foreign is the importer. Therefore, a combination
of policies that is Pareto-eﬃcient and gives the same utility to the two countries must maximize the sum of
Home and Foreign welfare in each sector. More generally, this notion of eﬃciency would also be appropriate in
asymmetric settings, provided that international lump sum transfers were available.
11The eﬃcient levels of T and S, which we denote by Teff and Seff, are respectively given by
T
eff = γ,a n d
S
eff = −γ.
Hence, eﬃcient policy combinations ensure that the relevant price wedges only reﬂect the ex-
ternality, not terms of trade considerations. In particular, the wedge between the domestic
consumer price and the foreign price (T) should be equal to the consumption externality γ
(Pigouvian consumption tax), and the wedge between the domestic producer price and the
foreign price (S + T)s h o u l db en i l .
Notice that the noncooperative level of S is equal to the eﬃcient level (SN = Seff), and
the noncooperative policies diﬀer from the eﬃcient policies only in that import taxes are too
high — and noncooperative trade volumes are therefore too low — relative to their eﬃcient
levels (TN >T eff). The ineﬃciently high level of T reﬂects in turn the unilateral incentive to
manipulate the terms of trade. Therefore, the potential gains from contracting in this setting
arise entirely from the ability to control the incentive to utilize import taxes to manipulate the
terms of trade. As a consequence of this feature — which is quite general, as argued in Bagwell
and Staiger (2001) — we will refer to internation a la g r e e m e n t sa s“ t r a d ea g r e e m e n t s , ”e v e n
though they may impose constraints beyond the choice of import taxes, because they represent
a t t e m p t st os o l v ew h a ti se v i d e n t l ya ti t sc o r eat r a d e—a n dt r a d ep o l i c y—p r o b l e m .
2.2. Uncertainty
We consider two possible sources of uncertainty: the consumption externality (γ) and the level
of domestic demand (α). Uncertainty about γ can be interpreted as uncertainty about the true
eﬃciency rationale for policy intervention, while shocks to α can be interpreted as shocks to the
trade volume that are irrelevant for eﬃcient policy levels.8 Focusing on uncertainty in γ and α
while abstracting from other sources of uncertainty helps to illustrate some general principles
for understanding how the optimal agreement depends on the source of uncertainty. In later
sections we discuss the extension of our results to more general stochastic environments.
We sometimes refer to γ and α as the state-of-the-world variables, or simply the “state”
variables. For now, we impose no further structure on the nature of uncertainty.
8We could alternatively consider a shock that shifts the domestic supply function, but the qualitative results
would not change.
12We consider the following simple timing: (1) the agreement is drafted: (2) uncertainty is
resolved; and (3) policies are chosen subject to the constraints set by the agreement. Implicit
in this timing is the assumption that agreements are perfectly enforceable: in this paper we
abstract from issues of self-enforcement of the agreements.9
Finally, we denote expected global welfare gross of contracting costs (henceforth simply
“gross global welfare”) by Ω(·) ≡ EWG(·).
2.3. The costs of contracting
Before we formalize the costs of contracting, we need to specify what type of contracts we will
consider. Throughout the paper we focus on instrument-based agreements, i.e. agreements
that impose (possibly contingent) constraints on policy instruments. In the concluding section
we brieﬂy discuss the possibility of outcome-based agreements, i.e. agreements that impose
constraints on equilibrium outcomes such as prices or trade volumes.10
We formalize the contracting costs associated with a trade agreement in a very stylized
way. Our central assumption is that these costs are higher, the more policy instruments the
agreement involves, and the more contingencies it includes.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that there are two kinds of contracting costs: the costs of
including state variables in the agreement — that is, the random variables α and γ —a n dt h e
costs of including policy variables — that is, τ,tf,s and th. We think of the cost of including
a given variable in the agreement as capturing both the cost of describing this variable (i.e.
deﬁning the variable, how it should be measured etc., along the lines of the “writing costs”
emphasized by Battigalli and Maggi, 2002) as well as the cost of verifying its value ex-post.11
9Also implicit here is the assumption that governments can costlessly observe the realized values of the
uncertain parameters. One might object that this is unrealistic for externality parameters, which are presumably
diﬃcult to ascertain even for a government, let alone the WTO courts. But our results remain valid even in the
extreme opposite case in which governments do not learn anything about γ ex-post: in this case the agreement
cannot be made contingent on γ, and the situation would be essentially equivalent to one where there is no
uncertainty. Also notice that this objection would have less force if we had political-economy motives rather
than externalities, because governments are likely to know well the political-economy pressures they face.
10We also abstract from agreements that are based on both instruments and outcomes, in the sense that
they constrain the relationship between policy instruments and equilibrium outcomes, such as for example an
agreement that constrains T to be a function of the import volume M.
11The interpretation of contracting costs as veriﬁcation costs is “tight” only if the court automatically veriﬁes
(ex post) the values of the variables included in the contract. In the WTO, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
provides periodic reviews of the member countries’ trade policies. But a more thorough veriﬁcation process in
the WTO occurs only if there is a complaint by one of the contracting parties. Broadly, we expect that similar
qualitative insights would emerge in a richer model with veriﬁcation “on demand” to the extent that veriﬁcation
occurs in equilibrium at least with some probability.
13A broader interpretation of these contracting costs might also include negotiation costs: it is
reasonable to think that negotiation costs are higher when there are more policy instruments
on the table, and when there are more relevant contingencies to be discussed.
T h ec o s to fc o n t r a c t i n go v e ras t a t ev a r i a b l ei scs and the cost of contracting over a policy
variable is cp. We assume that, if a variable is included in the agreement, the associated cost is
incurred only once, regardless of how many times that variable is mentioned in the agreement;
in other words, there is no cost of “recall.”12 Summarizing, the cost of writing an agreement is
C = cs · ns + cp · np,
where ns and np are, respectively, the number of state and policy variables in the agreement.
We could allow C to be a more general increasing function of ns and np,b u tw ec h o o s et h e
linear speciﬁcation to simplify the analysis and the exposition of our results.13
A couple of examples may be useful to illustrate our assumptions on contracting costs:
Example 1: The agreement {τ +tf =3 },o re q u i v a l e n t l y{T =3 },s p e c i ﬁes a rigid commit-
ment for the total import tax, and costs 2cp.
Example 2: The agreement {τ = γ,s =5 } speciﬁes a state-contingent commitment for the
tariﬀ and a rigid commitment for the subsidy, and costs 2cp + cs.
Overall, our approach to modeling the costs of contracting has advantages and also lim-
itations. On the plus side, our approach preserves tractability while adding some generality
relative to other approaches in the literature.14 On the minus side, our approach abstracts from
some potentially important considerations: for example, we assume that the number of state
variables ns summarizes the costs of state-contingency, but in reality this cost might depend
as well on the “coarseness” of the contingencies (e.g. it might be easier to verify a clause like
(T =0if γ ≤ 1) then a clause T = γ). On balance, however, we believe that the basic feature
12Relaxing the assumption of no recalling costs would introduce additional agreements for consideration (i.e.
agreements that diﬀer by the number of times a given variable appears), but the main qualititive insights of our
analysis are unlikely to change.
13The only results that could change under a more general cost function of the form C(ns,n p) are those con-
cerning the complementarity/substitutability between rigidity and discretion; for example if the cross-derivative
of C with respect to ns and np were positive and suﬃciently high, rigidity and discretion would be always
substitutes. Also, it might be reasonable to assume that it is more costly to contract over internal measures
(tf,s,t h)t h a no v e rt a r i ﬀs( τ), because in reality it is easier to verify border measures than internal measures.
But as will become clear below, in this case our qualitative results would only be strengthened.
14For example, Battigalli and Maggi (2002) associate a cost c with each “primitive sentence” included in
the contract, and the analogue in our setting would be to associate a cost c with each state variable or policy
included in the contract. Under this analogy, the form of contracting costs adopted by Battigalli and Maggi is
a special case of our approach in which cs = cp.
14that contracting costs are increasing in the number of state variables and policies included in
the agreement is likely to be preserved in most reasonable models of these costs, and for this
reason we believe that our approach provides a good starting point for the analysis of trade
agreements as endogenously incomplete contracts.
3. Optimal Agreements
I no r d e rt oc h a r a c t e r i z et h eo p t i m a lc h o i c eo fa g r e e m e n t ,w en e e dt oi n t r o d u c es o m ed e ﬁnitions
and notation. First, we say that two agreements are equivalent if they implement the same
outcome and have the same cost. Second, we refer to the eﬃciently-written ﬁrst-best agreement
as the least costly among the agreements that implement the ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m e .W ew i l ll a b e l
this simply the {FB} agreement. In a similar vein, we refer to the case of no agreement as
the “empty agreement,” which formally is denoted {∅}.F i n a l l y , a n optimal agreement is an
agreement that maximizes expected global welfare net of contracting costs (henceforth simply
“net global welfare”), that is ω ≡ Ω − C.
A natural and convenient way to characterize the optimal agreement is to track how it
changes as the general level of contracting costs increases. We consider a proportional increase
in the contracting costs (cp,c s). To express our results in a simple comparative-statics fashion,
we let cp ≡ c, and cs ≡ k · c, where k ≥ 0 captures the cost of contracting over a state
variable relative to that of contracting over a policy variable, while c captures the general level
of contracting costs (we henceforth refer to c simply as “contracting costs”). In much of the
analysis to follow, we keep k ﬁxed and consider changes in c. Note that, with this new notation,
the total contracting cost can then be expressed as C = c·(np +k ·ns) ≡ c·m. The variable m
provides a rough measure of the “complexity” of the agreement, in that it captures the number
of policy variables and states involved (with the latter weighed by the parameter k).
Before we impose more structure on the nature of uncertainty and the set of agreements
under consideration, we present three results that hold quite generally. Our ﬁrst result provides
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an agreement to be optimal for a range of contracting
costs. To develop these conditions, we begin by observing that any agreement A is characterized
by a level of complexity m(A) and a level of gross global welfare Ω(A),a n dt h e r e f o r ei ti s
associated with a point in (Ω,m) space. If we plot this point for each feasible agreement, we
obtain a set that describes all the feasible combinations of Ω and m.D e n o t et h i ss e tb yF.
15Lemma 1. Consider a feasible set of agreements F. An agreement ˆ A in F is optimal for some
c if and only if it satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(i) ˆ A is optimal in its complexity class, i.e. there is no agreement A0 such that m(A0)=m( ˆ A)
and Ω(A0) > Ω( ˆ A);
(ii) for any pair of agreements A0,A 00 such that m(A0) ≤ m( ˆ A) ≤ m(A00),
Ω( ˆ A) ≥
m00 − ˆ m
m00 − m0Ω(A
0)+
ˆ m − m0
m00 − m0Ω(A
00) (3.1)
where m0 ≡ m(A0),m 00 ≡ m(A00) and ˆ m ≡ m( ˆ A).
Lemma 1 is illustrated by Figure 1. Each point drawn in the (Ω,m) space is a feasible
agreement. Consider the candidate agreement ˆ A. Condition (i) is that the candidate agreement
must be optimal in its complexity class. This is reﬂected in Figure 1 by the fact that ˆ A attains
the highest level of Ω on the vertical line that contains it. Condition (ii) is a kind of concavity
requirement on the Ω function. To explain in what sense this is a concavity condition, we ﬁrst
deﬁne ¯ Ω(m) as the maximum level of Ω that can be attained with an agreement of complexity
m — this is the level of gross global welfare as a reduced-form function of m. Condition (ii)
states that, for an agreement ˆ A (with associated complexity level ˆ m)t ob eo p t i m a lf o rs o m e
c, it must pass the following test: pick an arbitrary complexity level lower than ˆ m (call it m0),
and one higher than ˆ m (call it m00); the function ¯ Ω(m) must be concave with respect to the
three points m0, ˆ m and m00.T h ea g r e e m e n tˆ A satisﬁes condition (ii) as well and, as illustrated,
is the optimal agreement for c =ˆ c (as well as for a range of c around ˆ c)a c h i e v i n gt h em a x i m u m
net global welfare ω( ˆ A). By contrast the agreement ˜ A, while satisfying condition (i), does not
satisfy condition (ii), and so is not an optimal agreement for any c.15
The economic interpretation of the “concavity” condition (ii) is, broadly speaking, that there
must be declining gains in gross welfare from adding complexity to the agreement. Otherwise,
if it paid to move from A0 to the more complex ˆ A it would also pay to take the further step to
t h ee v e nm o r ec o m p l e xA00, in which case ˆ A would not be optimal for any c. From an economic
point of view, it may seem natural that there should be diminishing gross returns from including
additional variables in the agreement. However, as will be seen, this is often not true in the
contracting environment considered here.
15Note that conditions (i) and (ii) together are equivalent to the condition that the agreement A lie on the
upper boundary of the convex hull of F, depicted by the dashed line in Figure 1. This condition is also reﬂected
in Figure 1: agreement ˆ A is on the dashed line, while agreement ˜ A is below it.
16Our second result concerns the relationship between the level of contracting costs and the
complexity of the optimal agreement (as measured by m). Intuition suggests that this relation-
ship should be monotonic. The following result (whose proof is straightforward and omitted)
conﬁrms this intuition, showing that more complex agreements will be chosen when the level
of contracting costs is lower.
Lemma 2. Consider two non-equivalent agreements, A0 and A00.I fA0 is optimal for c = c0 and
A00 is optimal for c = c00 >c 0,t h e nm(A00) <m (A0).
To state our third result, we ﬁrst observe that, since the two policy instruments τ and tf are
perfect substitutes and matter only through their sum T, constraining one of the two instru-
ments but not the other would have no eﬀe c t .T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h ed o m e s t i ci n s t r u m e n t s
s and th, which matter only through their diﬀerence S. Hence, we can think of T and S as the
relevant policy variables, with the inclusion of each variable in the contract costing 2cp.
We may now state our third result: if an agreement is to achieve any improvement over the
noncooperative equilibrium, it must constrain import taxes. More formally:
Proposition 1. An agreement that constrains the eﬀective subsidy S (even in a state-contingent
way) while leaving the import tax T to discretion cannot improve over the noncooperative equi-
librium, and therefore cannot be an optimal agreement.
At a broad level, the intuition for this result is very simple. Contracting over S alone is
useless because, as we emphasized above, the ineﬃciency in the noncooperative equilibrium
concerns T,n o tS. To develop a more precise understanding of Proposition 1, let us begin
at the noncooperative equilibrium and consider an agreement that imposes a small exogenous
change in S. T h i st r i g g e r sac h a n g ei nt h eH o m eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sc h o i c eo fT.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
as we explain below, T will adjust to the exogenous change in S so as to maintain p∗ at the
noncooperative level. Recalling that Home’s policies aﬀect Foreign welfare only through the
terms of trade p∗, this implies that Foreign welfare is unchanged; and since the imposition of
ac o n s t r a i n to nS can only reduce Home welfare, global welfare goes down as a consequence.
Thus a small exogenous change in S cannot improve over the noncooperative equilibrium.
Why is T adjusted so that p∗ remains unchanged? To see this intuitively, consider for
simplicity the case in which there is no externality (γ =0 ). It is convenient to think of the
choice variable as being the import volume M, rather than the tariﬀ. Consider the ﬁrst-order
17condition for the choice of M if the subsidy is undistorted, i.e. S =0 . This condition can easily
be derived as Mp∗0(M)=p(M) − p∗(M),w h e r ep(M) is the inverse import demand function
and p∗(M) the inverse export supply function. The interpretation of this condition is standard:
Mp∗0(M) is the terms-of-trade gain from a marginal decrease in M,a n dp(M)−p∗(M) (which
is equal to the tariﬀ) is the deadweight loss from a marginal decrease in M.
Now consider the optimal choice of M in the presence of an exogenous subsidy S.T h e
ﬁrst order condition in this case becomes Mp∗0(M)=[ p(M) − p∗(M)] − SX0(p)p0(M).T h e
additional term −SX0(p)p0(M) captures the increase in subsidy expenditures generated by a
marginal decrease in M. We can now examine how an exogenous increase in S —s t a r t i n gf r o m
S =0—a ﬀects these marginal eﬀects. First note that increasing S does not aﬀect the marginal
terms-of-trade gain (Mp∗0(M)). Second, increasing S decreases the marginal deadweight loss
because it reduces p(M), the price at which the Home country is willing to import M;t h e
amount of this reduction can be found by diﬀerentiating the condition D(p)−X(p+S)=M for
ﬁxed M, yielding (dp/dS)M=const = X0
D0−X0. Third, introducing a small S increases the marginal
subsidy-expenditure term by X0(p)p0(M)= X0
D0−X0; but this exactly oﬀsets the reduction in the
marginal deadweight loss. Thus, a small exogenous S does not aﬀe c tt h en e tm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt
of changing M, and hence does not change the optimal import volume, which in turn implies
that the optimal p∗ is unaﬀected.16
We emphasize that, in a world of costless contracting, the result highlighted in Proposition
1 would be irrelevant, because if agreements were costless they would always be written in a
way that placed constraints on all policy instruments. But with costly contracting the result
of Proposition 1 gains relevance, as we show below.
At this point we impose more structure on the stochastic environment. It is convenient to
consider separately two cases: uncertainty in the externality (γ) and uncertainty in the level of
domestic demand (α). In a later section we consider multidimensional uncertainty.
16Notice that this intuitive argument does not rely on the linearity of the model, and indeed, it can be shown
that Proposition 1 extends to a setting of general non-linear demand and supply functions. Also, this result
carries through in a setting where governments use tariﬀ and subsidy instruments to pursue additional policy
goals such as revenue needs or distributional concerns. What is crucial for the result is that a government has
suﬃcient instruments to target the domestic (q − p)a n df o r e i g n( p − p∗) price wedge. Finally we note that
our result is distinct from and not contradictory to Copeland’s (1990) result that negotiating over tariﬀsc a n
generate surplus even if other instruments are non-negotiable. Copeland’s result implies that contracting over
tariﬀsi ssuﬃcient to generate some surplus, whereas Proposition 1 implies that it is also necessary.
183.1. Uncertainty about the consumption externality
In this subsection we focus on the case where only γ is uncertain. For the sake of exposi-
tional simplicity, we assume that γ can take two possible values with equal probability: a high
realization ¯ γ + ∆γ and a low realization ¯ γ − ∆γ,w i t h∆γ > 0.
We also impose more structure on the set of agreements under consideration: for the re-
mainder of this section we consider only agreements that impose separate equality constraints
on T and S. To be concrete, we allow for clauses of the type (T = γ) or (S =1 0 ) , but not for
clauses of the type (T + S =3 )or for inequality constraints of the type (T ≤ 1).17 We label
this class of agreements A0. In later sections we consider broader classes of agreements.
The ﬁrst step is to derive the eﬃciently-written ﬁrst-best agreement ({FB}). Clearly the
agreement {T = γ;S = −γ} implements the ﬁrst best outcome. This agreement has ns =1and
np =4and therefore costs (4+k)c.B u ti tm i g h tb ec o n j e c t u r e dt h a tt h eﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m ec o u l d
also be implemented without constraining S, and therefore be accomplished more cheaply, since
as we have noted previously in the noncooperative equilibrium only T diﬀers from its eﬃcient
level. This conjecture is incorrect, but it is instructive to see why. The reason is that an
agreement that constrains T but leaves discretion over S would permit the home government
to choose S according to its unilateral optimum given T, which we have previously labeled
SR(T). As we have observed, this unilateral optimum is equal to Seff if the choice of T is




Υ2 − (β + λ)2
Υ2 − λ(β + λ)
(T
N − T). (3.2)
By (3.2), the diﬀerence between SR(T) and Seff is proportional to the diﬀerence between TN
and T. As a consequence, an agreement that attempts to move T towards its eﬃcient level
without also constraining S will cause S to become distorted for terms-of-trade purposes.
In fact, one cannot implement the ﬁrst best outcome with an agreement that costs less than
(4+k)c,a n ds o{T = γ;S = −γ} is indeed the {FB} agreement. Note that both S and T are
17When there is signiﬁcant uncertainty, a noncontingent contract of the type g(τ,tf,t h,s)=0may do better
than a noncontingent contract that pins down T and/or S separately, for two reasons. First, if g constrains the
relationship between the components of T (for example as in τ =1−t2
f), it can mimic a weak binding (T ≤ #),
or more generally a constraint that T must lie in a certain subset of the real line. In a later section we consider
weak bindings and show that they can improve over strong bindings, because allowing for downward discretion
on T can be good. Second, if g constrains the relationship between T and S, it may achieve higher gross global
welfare than a contract that pins down the exact levels of T and S, again because it introduces some discretion.
This has the ﬂavor of an outcome-based contract, which we discuss in the concluding section.
19state-contingent in the {FB} agreement.
We next seek to characterize the optimal agreement as a function of the level of contracting
costs: What is the optimal way of restructuring the agreement as c rises from zero?
The {FB} agreement yields net global welfare equal to Ω(T = γ,S = −γ) − (4 + k)c.
Clearly, when c is suﬃciently small the {FB} a g r e e m e n ti so p t i m a l ;a n di fc is suﬃciently high,
the empty agreement (which costs nothing and yields global welfare Ω(T = TN,S = −γ))i s
optimal. The interesting question is then: What happens between these two extremes?
For intermediate levels of c, there are three cost classes of agreements that warrant consid-
eration: agreements costing (2 + k)c; agreements costing 4c; and agreements costing 2c.B y
Proposition 1, we can ignore agreements that constrain S but not T. Also, our assumption of no
recalling costs implies that we can ignore agreements where one policy instrument is contingent
but the other one is not (e.g. {T(γ),S}). Therefore we only have three kinds of agreements to
consider, in addition to {FB} and {∅}, as candidate optimal agreements: (i) agreements that
constrain T as a function of γ, which we denote {T(γ)}; (ii) agreements that constrain T and S
in a non-state-contingent fashion, which we denote {T,S}; and (iii) agreements that constrain
T in a non-state-contingent fashion, which we denote {T}.
The three types of agreements {T,S}, {T(γ)} and {T} are all incomplete, but they are each
incomplete in a diﬀerent way. To describe these diﬀerences, it is useful at this point to recall
the distinction, introduced by Battigalli and Maggi (2002), between two forms of contractual
incompleteness: rigidity, which occurs when some of the policy variables are constrained in a
non-contingent way; and discretion, which occurs when some of the policy variables are missing
from the agreement.18 We can thus say that the agreement {T,S} is rigid, the agreement
{T(γ)} features discretion (over S), and the agreement {T} is both rigid and discretionary.
To proceed further, it proves useful to introduce some new concepts. It is natural to deﬁne
the cost of rigidity as the loss of gross global welfare when the state variable γ is excluded
from the agreement, and the cost of discretion as the loss of gross global welfare when the
policy variable S is excluded from the agreement. For the moment we focus on the non-empty
a g r e e m e n t s ,s ow ec a ni g n o r et h ec a s ei nw h i c hb o t hT and S are discretionary.
We now make an important observation: in our contracting environment, rigidity and dis-
cretion interact in non-trivial ways. The cost of rigidity depends on whether or not discretion is
18Notice that, in general, rigidity and discretion as deﬁned in the text do not necessarily imply a loss of gross
surplus relative to the ﬁrst best. For example, if the demand parameter α is uncertain (as in section 3.2), then
the ﬁrst-best contract is rigid, because it does not include the state variable α.
20present in the agreement, and the cost of discretion depends on whether or not the agreement
i sr i g i d .T od e s c r i b et h i si n t e r a c t i o n ,w ei n t r o d u c et h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnitions:
a. The cost of discretion absent rigidity (CD): Ω{FB} − Ω{T(γ)};
b. The cost of discretion in the presence of rigidity (CD): Ω{T,S} − Ω{T};
c. The cost of rigidity absent discretion (CRTS): Ω{FB} − Ω{T,S};a n d
d. The cost of rigidity in the presence of discretion (CRT): Ω{T(γ)} − Ω{T}.
Notice that these four quantities are linearly dependent, since one can always be expressed as
a linear combination of the other three.
An interesting manifestation of the interaction between rigidity and discretion is the follow-
ing: while the cost of discretion absent rigidity, CD, is always positive, the cost of discretion
in the presence of rigidity, CD, may be negative. In other words, it is possible that Ω{T,S} is
lower than Ω{T}: conditional on the agreement being rigid, introducing discretion may increase
gross global welfare. Intuitively, introducing discretion (in S) into a rigid agreement is an indi-
rect way of introducing state-contingency in the agreement, and this is beneﬁcial, because the
unilateral choice of S — even if distorted — varies with γ in the “right” way (i.e. both SR(T)
and Seff are decreasing in γ). This beneﬁcial eﬀect of discretion may outweigh the negative
eﬀect of allowing a government to use S to manipulate the terms of trade. This suggests that
rigidity and discretion are complementary, in the sense that the presence of rigidity mitigates
the cost of discretion, possibly making it negative. Indeed, it can be conﬁrmed that CD < CD
for all parameter values. Note also that CD < CD is equivalent to CRTS > CRT. This is the
ﬂip-side of the complementarity we just highlighted: the presence of discretion decreases the
cost of rigidity.
We note that the indirect state-contingency eﬀect identiﬁed above, which is responsible
for the complementarity between rigidity and discretion, depends crucially on the fact that
the uncertain state variable (γ)a ﬀects the ﬁrst-best setting of domestic policies (S). As we
explain in the next subsection, if uncertainty concerns a state variable that does not aﬀect
the ﬁrst-best level of S (e.g. the demand level α), then the indirect state-contingency eﬀect
is inoperative. This suggests — and the next subsection conﬁrms — that the complementarity
b e t w e e nr i g i d i t ya n dd i s c r e t i o nh i n g e so nt h es o u r c eo fu n c e r t a i n t y ,a n dn e e dn o ta r i s ei na l l
uncertain environments.
We are now ready to return to the question we posed above: What is the optimal sequence
of agreements as c increases from zero? This question can be answered by using Lemmas 1 and
212, together with the complementarity property that we just highlighted.
Lemma 2 tells us that, as c increases, we must move from more complex to less complex
agreements. This immediately implies that the optimal sequence of agreements is a subsequence
of ({FB},{T,S},{T(γ)},{T},{∅}). We say “subsequence” because each of these agreements
(except {FB} and {∅})m a yb e“ s k i p p e d ”o v e ra sc increases.19
Next we use Lemma 1 together with the complementarity property identiﬁed above to
establish the following result: the agreements {T,S} and {T(γ)} cannot both be part of the
optimal sequence of agreements. To see this, suppose that the agreement {T,S} is part of the
optimal sequence. Then Figure 2a illustrates a consequence of the “concavity” condition of
Lemma 1: the point associated with {T,S} must lie (weakly) above the line connecting the
points associated with {T} and {FB}, which in turn implies 2(Ω{FB} − Ω{T,S}) ≤ k(Ω{T,S} −
Ω{T}), or, using the deﬁnitions above,
2CRTS ≤ kCD (3.3)
Similarly, suppose that {T(γ)} is part of the optimal sequence of agreements. Then, with
reference to Figure 2b, Lemma 1 implies that the point associated with {T(γ)} must lie (weakly)
above the line connecting the points associated with {T} and {FB}. Clearly this implies:
k(Ω{FB} − Ω{T(γ)}) ≤ 2(Ω{T(γ)} − Ω{T}),o r
kCD ≤ 2CRT (3.4)
Now recall that CD < CD and CRTS > CRT (complementarity between rigidity and dis-
cretion). This implies that (3.3) and (3.4) cannot both be satisﬁed: if there are diminishing
returns to complexity around {T,S} there cannot be diminishing returns to complexity around
{T(γ)}, and vice-versa. Hence, returns to complexity must be increasing around (at least) one
of these two agreements.
Figures 2a and 2b reﬂect this conclusion: if, as in Figure 2a, {T,S} is positioned above the
dotted line, {T(γ)} must lie below it; and if, as in Figure 2b, {T(γ)} is positioned above the
dotted line, {T,S} must lie below it.20 Intuitively, the agreement {T} features both rigidity
and discretion. But the complementarity between rigidity and discretion means that these two
19In the above statement we implicitly assume that k ≤ 2,s ot h a t{T(γ)} is not more costly than {T,S}.
But the statement is true also with k>2,b e c a u s ea sw ee s t a b l i s hb e l o w ,{T(γ)} and {T,S} cannot both be
part of the optimal sequence.
20Each ﬁgure is drawn under the assumption that k<2, but as can be seen from the preceding arguments
this is immaterial for the result.
22features are less costly when they occur together than when they occur separately, as in the
agreements {T,S} (which features only rigidity) and {T(γ)} (which features only discretion).
Therefore, {T,S} and {T(γ)} cannot both lie above the line connecting {T} and {FB}.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Assume that only γ is uncertain. There exist scalars c1, c2, c3 and c4 with
0 <c 1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3 ≤ c4 < ∞ such that the optimal agreement in A0 is:
(a) the {FB} agreement for c ∈ (0,c 1);
(b) of the form {T,S} for c ∈ (c1,c 2);
(c) of the form {T(γ)} for c ∈ (c2,c 3);
(d) of the form {T} for c ∈ (c3,c 4);a n d
(e) the empty agreement for c>c 4.
Moreover, either c2 = c1 or c3 = c2 (or both).
An important feature of Proposition 2 concerns the way contractual incompleteness varies
across policy instruments: the eﬀective subsidy S tends to be more discretionary than the
import tax T.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, for a range of contracting costs it may be optimal to contract
over T while leaving S to discretion, but it is never optimal to contract over S and leave T
to discretion. In this way, Proposition 2 predicts that trade agreements should always include
commitments over import taxes, and should only introduce commitments over domestic policies
as the agreement becomes more complete. This prediction resonates broadly with the approach
taken by the GATT/WTO, which has been to ﬁrst establish a base of commitments over import
tax levels, and only later to take on various domestic policies (most notably subsidies). Notice,
too, that our prediction does not rely on an assumption that embodies the commonly-held view
that border measures are more transparent than domestic policies and are therefore less costly
to contract over, an assumption that would only reinforce this prediction.
Consider next the signiﬁcance of the “complementary slackness” condition of Proposition 2:
if {T(γ)} is optimal for a range of c (i.e., if c2 <c 3), then {T,S} is not optimal for any c (i.e.,
c1 = c2), and vice-versa. In light of this condition, we may now pose the following question: As
contracting costs rise from zero, when is it optimal to ﬁrst economize on contracting costs by
introducing discretion (c2 <c 3), and when by ﬁrst introducing rigidity (c1 <c 2)?
To provide answers to this question in terms of underlying model parameters, we ﬁrst relate
at a broad intuitive level the way in which the cost of rigidity and the cost of discretion depend
23on the fundamentals of the contracting environment.
Let us start with the cost of rigidity. Intuitively, a rigid agreement “gets it right” only on
average, and therefore when the environment is more uncertain (i.e. when ∆γ is higher) the
cost of rigidity (with or without discretion) is higher.
The determinants of the cost of discretion (over S)a r em o r es u b t l e . 21 First, intuitively
the cost of discretion (with or without rigidity) is higher when the eﬀective subsidy S and the
import tax T are closer substitutes with regard to their eﬀect on the terms of trade. Thus a key
determinant of the cost of discretion is the degree of substitutability between policy instruments.
Recalling that the terms of trade are given by p∗(T,S)=[ α+α∗ −(β +λ)T −λS]/Υ,ar o u g h
measure of this substitutability is given by the marginal rate of substitution between T and S




λ +1 . This suggests that S is a closer substitute
for T — and hence the cost of discretion is higher — when demand is less elastic (β is low) and
when supply is more elastic (λ is high).
A second determinant of the cost of discretion is the wedge between the noncooperative and
eﬃcient tariﬀ, which in turn reﬂects the degree of home-country monopoly power as measured
by the (inverse of the non-cooperative) foreign export supply elasticity η∗. If the home country
has large monopoly power, then this wedge is large; therefore, the incentive to alter domestic
policies to manipulate the terms of trade is high, and hence the cost of discretion is high. Notice
that the home country’s monopoly power in our model is directly linked to the volume of trade,
and thus a primary determinant of its magnitude is the level of import demand, α.22 When α
is higher, η∗ is lower, and so the cost of discretion (with or without rigidity) is higher.
Finally, our earlier discussion of the indirect state-contingency eﬀect suggests that there is
an additional determinant of the cost of discretion, albeit one that applies only in the presence
of rigidity (CD): the extent to which the state-contingency introduced into a rigid agreement
by discretion is beneﬁcial. Intuitively, this eﬀect is stronger when uncertainty in γ is higher.
According to the intuition we developed above on the costs of rigidity and discretion, we
therefore expect {T,S} to be favored over {T(γ)} when the level of import demand α is high
(so that the cost of discretion is high) and when uncertainty ∆γ is low (so that the cost of
21Note that leaving discretion over S eﬀectively leaves discretion over the producer price wedge q − p∗ (see
the pricing relationships 2.1). As will be seen in section 4, there exist agreements outside class A0 that leave
discretion (only) on the consumer price wedge p − p∗, but this cannot be accomplished by agreements in A0.
22Note that α is the intercept of the Home country’s import demand function. For this reason we refer to α
as the import demand “level.”
24discretion is high and the cost of rigidity is low). Also, we highlighted above that the cost of
discretion tends to be high when the eﬀective subsidy S is a close substitute for the import tax
T, which in turn is the case when the demand slope β is low or the supply slope λ is high. The
following remark conﬁr m st h i si n t u i t i o n :
Remark 1. (i) If the import demand level α is suﬃciently high and/or the degree of uncertainty
∆γ is suﬃciently low, then c1 <c 2 = c3: the optimal sequence of agreements always includes
{T,S} and never includes {T(γ)}.
(ii) If the demand slope β is suﬃciently low (so that S is a close substitute for T), then
c2 = c3 = c4: the optimal sequence of agreements may include {T,S}, but it never includes
{T(γ)} or {T}.
(iii) If the supply slope λ is suﬃciently low (so that S is a poor substitute for T), then c1 =
c2 <c 3: the optimal sequence of agreements always includes {T(γ)} and never includes {T,S}.
The results in Remark 1 stand in marked contrast to those of Battigalli and Maggi (2002):
there, as contracting costs rise, ﬁrst the optimal contract becomes rigid, and then discretion is
introduced. Here, due to the non-separability of the contracting problem across instruments,
it may be optimal to economize on contracting costs by introducing discretion before rigidity,
and it may be that rigidity is not optimal for any level of contracting costs.
We argued above that rigidity and discretion are complementary in this environment, but
we have not yet established whether it can indeed be optimal to combine rigidity and discretion
(as in the agreement {T}). It is not hard to ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions such that {T} is optimal
for a range of c, i.e. such that c3 <c 4. For example, one simple suﬃcient condition is that
uncertainty (∆γ)i ss u ﬃciently low and policy instruments are not very substitutable (λ is low
or β is high). To see this, notice that when ∆γ gets close to zero, any contingent agreement
becomes dominated, leaving only {T}, {T,S} and the empty agreement as candidates for an
optimum; and if policy instruments are very dissimilar {T} dominates {T,S}.
Remark 1 highlights how various parameters aﬀect the optimal sequence of agreements as
c varies, but it does not describe the eﬀects of changing a parameter while holding constant
all other parameters (including c). We conclude this subsection by presenting two of the more
illuminating comparative-static results, namely, those for α and ∆γ.
W es t a r tw i t hc h a n g e si nt h ei m p o r td e m a n dl e v e l ,α. As we argued above, an increase
in α tends to increase the cost of discretion. Intuitively, then, increasing α while keeping all
25other parameters constant should lead to a lower degree of discretion. Also, it can be veriﬁed
that α does not aﬀect the costs of rigidity (CRT or CRTS); thus, intuitively, α does not
aﬀect directly the degree of rigidity. More speciﬁcally, as α increases, it can be shown that the
optimal agreement never switches from {T} to {T(γ)} or from {T,S} to {FB},a n ds oi ti s
never the case that a change in α changes the degree of rigidity without aﬀecting the degree of
discretion. Nevertheless, the complementarity between rigidity and discretion implies that, as
α increases and discretion falls, rigidity may also fall, as in the movement from {T} to {FB}.
The following proposition conﬁr m st h i si n t u i t i o n :
Proposition 3. As the import demand level α increases (holding all other parameters ﬁxed):
(i) The optimal degree of discretion decreases, in the sense that the number of policy instru-
ments speciﬁed in the optimal agreement increases (weakly); (ii) The optimal degree of rigidity
decreases (weakly).
The result of Proposition 3(i) reﬂects the monopoly power eﬀect. In particular, the higher
is the degree of monopoly power (the higher is α), the less desirable it is to leave policy
instruments to discretion, with the order in which instruments are tied down (ﬁrst T and then
also S) dictated by Proposition 2.
Proposition 3(i) suggests a possible explanation for an important aspect of the evolution
from GATT to the WTO, namely, the fact that the WTO has introduced a substantial eﬀort
to regulate the use of domestic subsidies that was not present in GATT, and is moving toward
further constraints on domestic policies more generally. The possible explanation for this high-
lighted by Proposition 3(i) is that the increase in trade volumes over time (which in our model
c a nb ec a p t u r e db ya ni n c r e a s eo fα) has increased the cost of discretion, which in turn has
augmented the need to constrain subsidies and other domestic policies in the agreement.23
Our analysis developed thus far also suggests a broader insight. The essence of high instru-
ment substitutability is that a government has access to a rich array of domestic policies which
it can use to manipulate terms of trade if import taxes are constrained by a trade agreement.
And the essence of high monopoly-power is that it faces a relatively inelastic foreign export
23This interpretation might be more convincing if rising trade volumes increase the cost of discretion when
market power is held ﬁxed, but in our linear model an increase in α increases both trade volume and market
power. One way to generate rising trade volumes while holding market power ﬁxed within our model is to
increase α, λ
∗,a n dβ
∗ in an appropriate fashion. Using (3.2), it can be conﬁrmed with these parameter changes
that rising trade volume with ﬁxed market power does indeed increase the cost of discretion over domestic
policies (S).
26supply. Arguably, both of these conditions are most likely to apply to large developed countries.
Therefore, it is more likely that contracting over domestic policies (such as S) is attractive for
large developed countries than for small/developing countries. While our two-country model
cannot address this issue formally, these results are at least suggestive of the possible beneﬁts
of a kind of “special and diﬀerential treatment” rule for small/developing countries when it
comes to contracting over domestic policies (such as subsidies).24
Finally, as we highlighted above, Proposition 3(ii) is a consequence of the complementarity
between rigidity and discretion. This implies that rising trade volumes (higher α)m a ym a k e
it worthwhile to add contingencies to the agreement, but only because it is now worthwhile to
contract over domestic policies, and the value of adding state-contingencies to the agreement
is enhanced as a result.25
Next we consider the comparative-statics eﬀects of changes in the degree of uncertainty, ∆γ.
It is straightforward to establish the following result:
Proposition 4. As the degree of uncertainty ∆γ increases (holding all other parameters ﬁxed),
the optimal agreement may switch from a rigid agreement to a contingent agreement, but not
vice-versa.
By itself, this result is not particularly surprising: it seems inevitable that increasing un-
certainty should reduce the attractiveness of rigid agreements. But there is also a more subtle
feature of this result, which is that it concerns uncertainty over a state variable that is directly
relevant for the setting of T in the {FB} agreement. As we demonstrate in the next subsec-
tion, the eﬀects of increasing uncertainty over state variables (such as α) that are not directly
relevant for the setting of T in the {FB} can be very diﬀerent.
3.2. Uncertainty about the level of import demand
In the previous subsection we examined a stochastic environment where uncertainty concerns
only a state variable that aﬀects directly the ﬁrst-best levels of T and S.H e r ew ee x p l o r et h e
24In fact, when it comes to subsidies, Part VIII of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement
introduces just such an exemption from commitments for developing country members. We thank Robert
Lawrence for ﬁrst bringing this implication to our attention.
25We also note that it would not be accurate to say that an increase in α reduces both the degrees of discretion
and rigidity because it increases the surplus from contracting, and hence for α suﬃciently high the ﬁrst-best
agreement becomes optimal. It is not hard to verify that, starting from a parameter conﬁguration for which
{T,S} is optimal, increasing α will not cause a switch from this contract to {FB}.
27implications of a diﬀerent source of uncertainty, which in some sense is at the opposite extreme:
we now suppose that uncertainty concerns only a state variable (α) that has no impact on the
ﬁrst-best levels of T or S. We assume that α can take two possible values with equal probability:
¯ α + ∆α and ¯ α − ∆α,w i t h∆α > 0.
In this environment, the {FB} agreement takes the form {T =¯ γ;S = −¯ γ}.N o t i c e t h a t
the {FB} agreement is no longer state contingent, because it does not depend on the uncertain
parameter α,a n d¯ γ is a deterministic value. Also notice that, as an immediate implication
of Proposition 1, there are now four types of agreements that can potentially be optimal: (i)
the {FB} agreement, which is of the type {T,S}; (ii) agreements of the form {T(α)}; (iii)
agreements of the form {T}; and (iv) the empty agreement.
Two important new insights emerge in this environment. The ﬁrst is the possibility of the
agreement {T(α)},w h e r eT(α) is an increasing function. This has the ﬂavor of an escape-clause
type of agreement: when α is high, the underlying import volume is high, and so with T(α)
an increasing function the agreement {T(α)} allows for the import tariﬀ to rise in states of the
world in which the underlying import volume is high, broadly analogous to the escape clause
provided in GATT Article XIX.26
To understand the potential appeal of an escape clause in the current setting, recall that if
S is left to discretion (as in the agreement {T(α)}) then it will be used to manipulate the terms
of trade, and the incentive to do so will be stronger when α is higher. A higher T mitigates
the incentive to distort S for terms-of-trade purposes, and so allowing for a higher T when α
is higher can help to mitigate the use of S for purposes of terms-of-trade manipulation when
the incentive is highest to do so. Hence, the agreement {T(α)} provides a degree of indirect
incentive management, and in this way our model identiﬁes a novel rationale for the desirability
of escape clauses in trade agreements: an escape-clause type agreement of the form {T(α)} can
be attractive relative to a rigid agreement of the form {T} because it provides an indirect means
of managing the distortions associated with leaving S to discretion.
26We say that {T(α)} has the “ﬂavor” of an escape-clause type of agreement, because there are some important
features of GATT Article XIX that are not captured by {T(α)}. For instance, Article XIX includes an “injury”
test, which has no counterpart in {T(α)} (but we note that an explanation for the injury test is also lacking in
other theoretical interpretations of the escape clause, such as Bagwell and Staiger, 1990). Also, under Article
XIX a country is allowed to raise its tariﬀ in case of an import surge, whereas {T(α)} technically leaves no
discretion on T; but this feature can be captured by our model in a straightforward manner: as we argue
in section 5, imposing the equality constraint T = T(α) is equivalent to imposing the inequality constraint
T ≤ T(α).U n d e rt h el a t t e r ,w h e nα is higher the government is allowed to raise T up to a higher level, but is
n o tf o r c e dt od os o .
28The second new insight in the α-uncertainty environment is that rigidity and discretion
are no longer complementary, but are instead substitutable. Formally, it is easy to see that
the cost of discretion in the presence of rigidity, CD = Ω{T,S} − Ω{T}, is higher than the cost
of discretion absent rigidity, CD = Ω{FB} − Ω{T(α)}. T h i si sb e c a u s et h e{FB} agreement is
non-contingent, so Ω{FB} = Ω{T,S},a n dΩ{T(α)} > Ω{T}. The substitutability between rigidity
and discretion can also be seen from the perspective of the costs of rigidity, CRTS and CRT.
Clearly in this setting CRTS =0 , because the ﬁrst-best agreement is non-contingent, and
hence CRTS < CRT. Recall that this condition is equivalent to the condition CD > CD.
Intuitively, this reversal reﬂects two diﬀerences across the γ-uncertainty and α-uncertainty
environments. First, when α (alone) is uncertain the presence of rigidity does not confer any
extra value to discretion, because the ﬁrst-best level of S does not depend on α, and hence the
indirect state-contingency eﬀect — which underpins the complementarity between rigidity and
discretion in the γ-uncertainty case — is inoperative. And second, in the α-uncertainty case
the indirect incentive-management eﬀect is operative, because the ﬁrst-best level of T does
not depend on α,a n dt h i se ﬀect (which is not present in the γ-uncertainty case because the
ﬁrst-best level of T does depend on γ) makes the cost of discretion higher when the agreement
is rigid: the reason is that the adverse eﬀects of discretion over S can be mitigated by making
the value of T contingent on α, and this mitigation of the cost of discretion is not possible
within a rigid contract.
These observations, together with those made in the previous subsection, suggest an im-
portant insight: the interaction between rigidity and discretion depends crucially on the source
of uncertainty, and this dependence can be understood from the perspective of the indirect
state-contingency eﬀect (which pushes toward complementarity) and the indirect incentive-
management eﬀect (which pushes toward substitutability). When uncertainty concerns vari-
ables (such as γ)t h a ta r ed i r e c t l yr e l e v a n tf o rt h eﬁrst-best levels of both domestic instruments
(S)a n di m p o r tt a x e s( T), rigidity and discretion tend to be complementary, because the in-
direct state-contingency eﬀect is operative while the indirect incentive management eﬀect is
not. And when uncertainty concerns variables (such as α)t h a ta r enot directly relevant for the
ﬁrst-best levels of either S or T, rigidity and discretion tend to be substitutable, because the
indirect incentive-management eﬀect is operative while the indirect state-contingency eﬀect is
not. (The remaining cases of uncertainty over variables that are directly relevant for ﬁrst-best
levels of either S or T but not both can be understood from this perspective as well, as we
29describe in a later section).
One consequence of the substitutability between rigidity and discretion in the present sto-
chastic environment is that the “concavity” condition implied by Lemma 1 now may be satisﬁed
for all relevant complexity levels, and therefore we do not have a “complementary slackness”
condition as in the previous section: all four candidate agreements may be part of the optimal
sequence as c increases. The following proposition conﬁr m st h i sp o i n t :
Proposition 5. Consider the agreement class A0, and assume that only α is uncertain. There
exist scalars c1, c2,a n dc3 with 0 <c 1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3 < ∞ such that the optimal agreement is:
(a) the {FB} agreement {T =¯ γ;S = −¯ γ} for c ∈ (0,c 1);
(b) of the form {T(α)} for c ∈ (c1,c 2);
(c) of the form {T} for c ∈ (c2,c 3);a n d
(d) the empty agreement for c>c 3.
Since a key new insight in this environment is the possibility of the {T(α)} agreement, we
next ask, Under what conditions (if any) is the agreement {T(α)} optimal? The following
remark identiﬁes conditions under which {T(α)} is optimal for a range of c:
Remark 2. If k is suﬃciently small and λ is suﬃciently low (but strictly positive), then c1 <c 2:
an escape-clause-type agreement of the form {T(α)} is optimal for some c.
The result reported in Remark 2 is intuitive. If the degree of substitutability between T and
S is suﬃciently low (as when λ is low) so that leaving S to discretion is an attractive option,
then an escape-clause type agreement of the form {T(α)} is optimal for a range of c as long as
the added complexity of contracting over state variables (k)i ss u ﬃciently small.
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a tt h ee ﬀects of changes in the degree of uncertainty over α (∆α)d i ﬀer
in an interesting way from the eﬀects of changes in the degree of uncertainty over γ (∆γ)a s
reported in Proposition 4. Speciﬁcally, as ∆α increases, the optimal agreement may switch from
ac o n t i n g e n tt y p e{T(α)} to a rigid type {T,S}, which as Proposition 4 indicates can never
happen with an increase in ∆γ.I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h i s r e ﬂects the workings of the monopoly power
eﬀect and the indirect incentive management eﬀect, and the fact that the cost of discretion
(CD) is not only rising in α but also convex. The key point is that as uncertainty over α
rises, CD rises, and it may therefore be optimal to move from a contingent agreement with
discretion — where the contingencies provide indirect incentive management — to an agreement
30without discretion where the contingencies are no longer beneﬁcial. This conﬁrms our earlier
observation that the eﬀects of uncertainty on the optimal agreement depend on whether this
uncertainty concerns state variabl e st h a ta r ed i r e c t l yr e l e v a n tt oﬁrst best policy levels (as in
∆γ) or rather state variables that are irrelevant to the ﬁrst best policy levels (as in ∆α).
3.3. Multidimensional uncertainty
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we focused on the case of one-dimensional uncertainty. Here we consider
how the main results are modiﬁed when both γ and α are uncertain.
A ﬁrst observation is that the {FB} agreement continues to be {T = γ;S = −γ} and
therefore costs (4 + k)c, just as in the case where only γ is uncertain. A second observation is
that, besides the {FB} agreement and the empty agreement, there are now ﬁve agreements that
can potentially be optimal, four that we have considered already and a new one. The four that
we have seen already are {T,S}, {T(γ)}, {T(α)} and {T}; the new one is {T(α,γ)}. Hence,
the main diﬀerence compared to the case of one-dimensional uncertainty is that there are three
potentially optimal contingent-T agreements ({T(γ)}, {T(α)} and {T(α,γ)}), instead of just
one. Intuitively, it may be appealing to make T contingent on α,o nγ or on both, depending
on the exact distribution of uncertainty.
It is simple to establish suﬃcient conditions under which the agreement {T(α,γ)} is optimal
for a range of contracting costs: fore x a m p l e ,t h i si se n s u r e di f( i )k is suﬃciently small, (ii) the
cost of discretion is not too high (for example because S is a poor substitute for T), and (iii)
α and γ are not perfectly correlated.27
It is worth emphasizing the possibility that, even though the {FB} agreement has T con-
tingent on γ, the optimal agreement may be {T(α)}: in the presence of contracting costs it
may be optimal to make T c o n t i n g e n to nt h e“ w r o n g ”s t a t ev a r i a b l e ,i . e .t h eo n et h a ti sn o t
relevant for the ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c yl e v e l s . 28
Aside from the changes in results highlighted above, the other qualitative insights that we
derived in the context of one-dimensional uncertainty generalize in a natural way to a setting
where both α and γ are uncertain. For example, a higher α leads to a lower degree of discretion
27Consider the extreme case k =0 .T h e n{T(α,γ)} dominates {T(α)}, {T(γ)} and {T}.M o r e o v e r ,{T,S}
is dominated by {FB}. As a consequence, {T(α,γ)} is the only agreement that can be optimal, besides {FB}
and the empty agreement. And if the cost of discretion is not too high, {T(α,γ)} is optimal for some c.
28In reality it is probably the case that α is easier to describe and verify, so the cost of contracting over α is
lower than the cost of contracting over γ. But this would of course only strengthen our point, which holds even
in the absence of such an asymmetry in the cost of contracting over state variables.
31in the optimal contract, similarly to the one-dimensional uncertainty case. Also our results
about the complementarity or substitutability between rigidity and discretion generalize in an
intuitive way: rigidity and discretion tend to be complementary if uncertainty in γ is important
relative to uncertainty in α, and vice-versa. Overall, then, the essential insights of our one-
dimensional uncertainty analysis are preserved in an environment where both γ and α are
uncertain.
4 .T h eR o l eo ft h eN a t i o n a lT r e a t m e n tC l a u s e
In this section we evaluate the National Treatment (NT) clause as a means to economize on
contracting costs. For our purposes, the relevant part of the NT clause can be found in GATT
Article III.2, which addresses internal taxation. Within the context of our model, we represent
t h ec o r eo ft h eN Tr u l eb yt h es i m p l ec o n s t r a i n tth = tf.29 It is important to note that, while the
NT provision restricts internal taxes to be the same, it allows the importing country discretion
over the level at which these taxes are set. In line with our assumptions on contracting costs,
we assume that including the NT clause in the agreement costs 2cp.30
For simplicity, we rely on institutional motivation to restrict our attention to just this
particular clause: that is, we expand the class of feasible agreements A0 to allow for agreements
that include the NT clause, and examine conditions under which the optimal agreement in this
wider class includes the NT clause. We refer to an agreement that includes the NT clause as an
“NT-based” agreement. As indicated above, we focus on an extended set of agreements that
includes the class considered in the previous section (A0) plus the class of NT-based agreements.
Letting ANT denote the class of NT-based agreements, we thus focus on the set of agreements
A0 ∪ ANT.
29There are two interpretation issues that can be raised here. First, Article III.2 speaks of “treatment no less
favorable,” which suggests that a more accurate formalization of the NT provision is given by the inequality
constraint th ≥ tf. However, in our model this constraint would always be binding, so there would be no gain
in allowing for this inequality constraint. Also, Article III.1 restricts attention to measures that are applied
“...so as to aﬀord protection...”. This sentence can be read in various ways, including that a foreign product
can be taxed more heavily as long as this is motivated by legitimate policy objectives. This is not an issue in
the context of our model, since there is no eﬃciency rationale for treating the imported product less favorably
than the locally produced good. For a model where this is a possibility, see Horn (2006). See also Horn and
Mavroidis (2004) for legal and economic analyses of Article III text and case law.
30It could be argued that including an NT clause in the agreement should cost less than specifying exact levels
for th and tf, so it might be more realistic to assume that the NT clause costs less than 2cp. By abstracting
from this consideration we are stacking the deck against NT: if including the NT clause costs less than 2cp,t h e
parameter region under which NT is optimal will be wider.
32The points we make in this section do not depend on the exact nature of the uncertainty,
so we will allow for multidimensional uncertainty as in section 3.3. Also, we continue to focus
on the case of a consumption externality, but the main insights would not change if we had a
production externality or political-economy motives along the lines of section 6.
We begin by observing that the relationships between price wedges and policies are diﬀerent
for non-NT agreements and NT-based agreements. For non-NT agreements, these relationships
are given by (2.1) as recorded in section 2, and within this class we can focus on agreements
that tie down S and/or T. However, for NT-based agreements, the arbitrage conditions become
p = p
∗ + τ + t,a n d ( 4 . 1 )
q = p
∗ + τ + s.
Within this class, we can focus on agreements that tie down some or all of τ, t,a n ds.
Notice that both the eﬃcient outcome and the noncooperative equilibrium, derived in section
2.1 in the absence of NT, can also be implemented with policies that conform to the NT clause.
In particular, the eﬃcient policies under NT are given by τeff =0 , teff = γ,a n dseff =0,
and the noncooperative equilibrium outcome can be achieved with policies that conform to NT
according to τN = p∗/η∗, tN
h = tN
f ≡ tN = γ, and sN =0 . Hence, there is no inherent violation
of NT in the noncooperative equilibrium of our model, and if the NT clause has any real bite,
it must be because other contractual obligations create incentives for the importing country to
use internal taxation in a discriminatory way.
There are many kinds of NT-based agreements, but we can reduce the number that must be
considered by focusing only on NT-based agreements that can be strictly optimal in the class
A0 ∪ANT. It turns out that the only type of NT-based agreement that can be strictly optimal
i so n et h a tt i e sd o w nτ and s, leaving the common consumption tax t to discretion. We denote
this type of agreement by {NT,τ,s}. The next remark states the point.
Remark 3. Consider the agreement class A0∪ANT. The only NT-based agreements that can
be strictly optimal are of the form {NT,τ,s}.
The intuition for this result can be understood as follows. An agreement of the type
{NT,τ,s} leaves discretion over the common consumption tax t. But expression (4.1) re-
veals a more fundamental feature: this agreement leaves discretion over the consumer price
wedge p − p∗, while tying down the producer price wedge q − p∗. And as we remarked earlier
33(see footnote 21), this kind of discretion cannot be generated by a non-NT agreement. This is a
subtle point that bears emphasis: an agreement that imposes separate constraints on (some or
all of) the policy instruments (s,τ,th,t f),o re q u i v a l e n t l yo nT and/or S, cannot leave discretion
over the consumer price wedge while tying down the producer price wedge. This can be done
only by constraining the relationship between the internal consumption taxes th and tf;a n d
imposing NT is a simple way of doing this. This is why an NT-based agreement can potentially
achieve a strict improvement over non-NT agreements. It is also not hard to see that the only
NT-based agreement that can strictly improve over non-NT agreements is {NT,τ,s}.31
We next seek conditions under which an NT-based agreement of the form {NT,τ,s} is
strictly optimal for a range of contracting cost c. We start with an intuitive discussion.
How attractive is {NT,τ,s} as a way to save on contracting costs? Relative to {FB},t h e
agreement {NT,τ,s} implies lower contracting costs (as long as ∆γ > 0). On the other hand,
{NT,τ,s} cannot achieve the ﬁrst best outcome, because it leaves discretion over consumption
taxes, and this discretion will be used by governments to manipulate terms of trade. In what
follows we refer to the “cost of discretion over t” as the diﬀerence in gross global surplus between
{FB} and {NT,τ,s},t h a ti sΩ{FB} − Ω{NT,τ,s}. Just as we saw in section 3.1 that the cost
of discretion over S depends critically on the degree of instrument substitutability and the
magnitude of the home-country monopoly power, it may be seen that the cost of discretion
over t d e p e n d sc r i t i c a l l yo nt h e s ef a c t o r sa sw e l l ,a n df o rt h es a m er e a s o n s .
To see this, consider ﬁrst the degree of substitutability between t and τ. Clearly, if t and
τ are highly substitutable, then any constraints placed on τ (and s) through an NT-based
agreement can be largely undone if t is left to discretion, just as with S and T for non-NT
agreements. Importantly, though, the underlying parameter conditions that cause t and τ to
be highly substitutable are a high β and/or low λ, and these are essentially opposite to the
conditions that cause S and T to be highly substitutable (low β and/or high λ). This can be
conﬁrmed from the equilibrium terms of trade, expressed now as a function of τ, t and s:
p
∗(τ,t,s)=q
∗ =[ α + α
∗ − (β + λ)τ − λs − βt]/Υ.
When λ is close to zero, t and τ are close to perfect substitutes, and hence {NT,τ,s} oﬀers
little improvement over the empty agreement. If β is close to zero, t is nearly useless as a means
to distort terms of trade, and hence the cost of discretion over t approaches zero.
31Note in particular that, since the NT clause costs 2cp, a contingent NT-based agreement of the form
{NT,τ(·),s(·)} cannot be strictly optimal, because it costs as much as the {FB} agreement.
34Now consider the degree of home-country monopoly power. This can be shown to aﬀect the
cost of discretion over t in a similar way as the cost of discretion over S: when the home country
enjoys higher monopoly power over trade, the incentive to distort t in order to manipulate terms
of trade is stronger. And since a key determinant of the degree of home-country monopoly power
is the import demand level, when α is higher the cost of discretion over t is higher, thus making
{NT,τ,s} less attractive.
Having discussed at a broad intuitive level the pros and cons of NT-based agreements of
the form {NT,τ,s}, the next question is whether there exists a parameter region in which the
optimal agreement is indeed of the type {NT,τ,s}. The answer is yes. To see why, notice
ﬁrst that, if β is small, {NT,τ,s} can implement an outcome close to the ﬁr s tb e s t( teff = γ,
τeff =0 ,s eff =0 ), because the importing government will set t close to γ. Recalling the
“concavity” condition of Lemma 1, it is easy to see that, if β is suﬃciently small, moving
from {NT,τ,s} to a more complex agreement can oﬀer at best a negligible gain, while moving
from {NT,τ,s} to a less complex agreement necessarily implies a non-negligible loss. This
immediately implies that the concavity condition implied by Lemma 1 is satisﬁed. And since
{NT,τ,s} is undominated in its complexity class, both conditions of Lemma 1 are met.
The following proposition records this result:
Proposition 6. Consider the agreement class A0∪ANT.I f∆γ > 0 and β is suﬃciently small,
then there is an intermediate range of c for which the optimal agreement includes the NT clause.
Proposition 6 identiﬁes a simple condition under which our model can rationalize the use
of an NT-based agreement: an agreement of this kind is strictly optimal if the degree of sub-
stitutability between t and τ is suﬃciently small, and the level of elementary contracting costs
c lies in some intermediate range.32 Intuitively, this condition describes a world in which the
NT-based agreement gets close to the ﬁrst best while avoiding the need to utilize costly state-
contingencies, by utilizing instead the indirect state-contingency associated with discretion over
internal taxes constrained only by the NT clause.
32The reader might wonder whether our model can rationalize a contingent NT agreement of the form
{NT,τ(·),s} as a strictly optimal agreement. As remark 3 states, under our contracting cost assumptions
the answer is no. But if we modiﬁed slightly our contracting cost assumptions by assuming that the NT clause
c o s t sl e s st h a n2cp — see footnote 30 — then there would exist a parameter region where a contingent NT agree-
ment is optimal. Incidentally, note from the NT pricing relationships in 4.1 that an agreement where both τ
and s are contingent is equivalent to one where only τ or s is contingent.
355 .T h eR o l eo fW e a kB i n d i n g s
In the previous sections we focused on agreements that impose equality constraints ("strong
bindings"), as in {T =2 } or {NT,τ =0 ,s=0 }. In a world of costless contracting where the
ﬁrst best outcome would be implemented, there would be nothing to gain from using inequality
constraints. In the presence of contracting costs, however, it may not be optimal to implement
the ﬁrst-best outcome, and as we argue in this section, in a second-best environment it may be
preferable to impose policy ceilings ("weak bindings") rather than strong bindings. Below we
make this claim more formal, but as a ﬁrst step we develop some intuition through a simple
example.
Suppose that only γ is uncertain, and focus on agreements that constrain the import tax
T.A saﬁr s to b s e r v a t i o n ,w en o t et h a tw e a kb i n d i n g sc a na c h i e v ea tl e a s tt h es a m el e v e lo fn e t
global welfare as strong bindings. Intuitively, this is because the purpose of the agreement is to
prevent governments from raising import taxes above their eﬃcient level. The next question is:
can weak bindings oﬀer a strict improvement over strong bindings? To answer this question,
we need to distinguish between contingent and rigid bindings.
It is clear that a contingent weak binding (e.g. {T ≤ γ})c a n n o to ﬀer a strict improvement
over a contingent strong binding (e.g. {T = γ}). The reason is that a contingent strong binding
can position the policy variable exactly where it is optimal to place it for all realizations of the
state variable, and so the added ex-post ﬂexibility that a weak binding oﬀe r sc a n n o tb eo fv a l u e .
When it comes to rigid bindings, however, the situation is diﬀerent. Compare a rigid strong
binding of the form {T = ¯ T} with the corresponding rigid weak binding {T ≤ ¯ T}.W e w i l l
argue that for some conﬁgurations of parameters the latter can oﬀer a strict improvement over
the former. Let TN(γ) denote the noncooperative equilibrium level of T as a function of γ.
Intuitively, and noting that TN is increasing in γ, the optimal level of the strong binding ¯ T
must be below TN(¯ γ +∆γ), but it may be above TN(¯ γ −∆γ).I f¯ T is above TN(¯ γ −∆γ),t h e n
a weak binding is strictly preferable, because in the low state the government sets T below the
binding, and this improves global welfare. Clearly there exist conﬁgurations of parameters for
w h i c ht h i si st h ec a s e .
T h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o nc o n ﬁrms and extends this intuition. In particular, we show that the
above results are valid not only for the import tax T or the tariﬀ τ, but also for the other
policy instruments that the agreement may need to bind, namely the production subsidies.
36The intuition for the extended result is similar: governments are tempted to distort production
subsidies in import-competing industries upwards, and hence the relevant constraint is an upper
bound on the subsidy.33 The proposition is valid regardless of which state (γ or α)i su n c e r t a i n ,
so we do not specify the source of uncertainty.
To express the result in a concise way, we let: AS ≡ A0∪ANT denote the class of agreements
we have considered thus far; AW denote the same class of agreements except that strong bindings
are replaced by weak bindings; and ARW denote the same class except that rigid strong bindings
are replaced by rigid weak bindings.
Proposition 7. (i) Weak bindings cannot do worse than strong bindings: maxA∈AW ω(A) ≥
maxA∈AS ω(A). (ii) Rigid weak bindings can oﬀer a strict improvement over rigid strong bind-
ings: maxA∈ARW ω(A) > maxA∈AS ω(A) for some conﬁgurations of parameters.
Note that a rigid weak binding combines rigidity and discretion, since the ceiling does not
depend on the state of the world and a government has discretion to set the policy below the
ceiling. Thus, Proposition 7 highlights another sense in which rigidity and discretion may be
complementary ways to economize on contracting costs: if the agreement is rigid, it may be
valuable to give governments downward discretion in the setting of the relevant policies.
In light of the above result, our model suggests that the constraints imposed by trade
agreements should predominantly take the form of weak bindings. This prediction is broadly
consistent with the observed nature of the GATT/WTO contract, where policy commitments
are essentially all in the form of weak bindings.34
33As applied to trade taxes, the proposition would also remain valid in an export sector. However, it would
have to be qualiﬁed with respect to the domestic instruments, because in export sectors the terms-of-trade
motives lead to domestic interventions of reverse signs (i.e., taxes on domestic production of the export good,
and subsidies on domestic consumption of the export good).
34We note here that this is not the only possible explanation for the use of weak bindings. Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2005) propose an alternative explanation based on political-economy considerations: their
basic idea is that weak bindings may be desirable because they induce lobbies to pay contributions even after
the agreement is signed, since a government can credibly threaten to lower tariﬀs below the ceiling levels, and this
in turn reduces the net return to capital in the protected sectors, thereby mitigating the allocative distortions
caused by lobbying. We also note that the explanation proposed here is closely related to the one proposed in
Bagwell and Staiger (2005), where weak bindings may be preferred to strong bindings in the presence of political-
economy shocks that are privately observed by governments. One key diﬀerence is that private information and
the absence of international transfers prevents governments from implementing the ﬁr s tb e s ti nt h eB a g w e l l -
Staiger paper, thereby opening the possibility that weak bindings may be attractive, whereas here the presence
of contracting costs makes it too costly to implement the ﬁrst best. Another diﬀerence is that, while Bagwell
and Staiger’s model considers only import tariﬀs, here we establish that weak bindings are preferable to strong
bindings also when applied to domestic subsidies.
376. Production Externalities and Political Economy
Thus far we have assumed that a consumption externality provides the eﬃciency rationale
for policy intervention. In this section we consider two alternative possibilities: ﬁrst, that
a production externality provides the eﬃciency rationale for policy intervention, and second,
that political motives serve this role. To keep the discussion simple, we return to the class
of agreements A0, but the arguments we present here are easily extended to allow for the
possibility of NT-based agreements and weak bindings.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a production externality. We set γ ≡ 0 and suppose that there is
a positive production externality in the home country equal to σX with σ>0: as before, this
externality enters directly and separably into the representative home-country citizen’s utility
and does not cross borders. We allow that both σ and α may be uncertain.
In this environment, it is straightforward to establish that the {FB} agreement takes the
form {T =0 ;S = σ}, so that only S is now state-contingent. Notice the diﬀerence between this
case and that of an uncertain γ,w h e r et h eﬁrst-best levels of both S and T are state-contingent.
As anticipated by our discussion in previous sections, this diﬀerence has subtle implications for
the nature of the optimal agreement, and we detail these below.
A ﬁrst diﬀerence is the following. While the set of candidate optimal agreements (aside from
the {FB} agreement) are similar to those for the case of a consumption externality identiﬁed
in subsection 3.3, except of course that {T(γ)} and {T(γ,α)} are replaced respectively by
{T(σ)} and {T(σ,α)}, the potential appeal of making T contingent on σ is distinct from the
p o t e n t i a la p p e a lo fm a k i n gT contingent on γ, and arises for reasons analogous to the potential
appeal of the escape-clause-type agreement {T(α)}. In particular, making T contingent on
σ is potentially attractive because it provides an indirect means of managing the distortions
associated with leaving S to discretion (i.e., because of the indirect incentive management
eﬀect).35 Notice also that the three agreements {T(α)}, {T(σ)} and {T(σ,α)} are potentially
attractive for a similar reason; intuitively, then, the performance of these agreements relative
to each other will depend on the exact nature of the uncertainty, including which of the two
35To see this, recall that if S is left to discretion (as for example in the agreement {T(σ)}) then it will be
distorted from its Pigouvian level and used to manipulate the terms of trade. However, the higher is σ,t h el o w e r
is the noncooperative trade volume and hence the lower will be the terms-of-trade incentive to distort S away
from its Pigouvian level. The implication, then, is that the incentive to distort S for terms-of-trade reasons
will be stronger when σ is lower according to the monopoly power eﬀect. A higher T mitigates the incentive to
distort S for terms-of-trade purposes, and so allowing for a higher T when σ is lower can help to mitigate the
use of S for purposes of terms-of-trade manipulation when the incentive is highest to do so.
38sources of uncertainty is more important.
A second diﬀerence concerns the complementarity/substitutability between rigidity and dis-
cretion. As noted previously, uncertainty about state variables that aﬀect the ﬁrst-best level of
S (e.g. γ) tends to generate complementarity (through the indirect state-contingency eﬀect),
whereas uncertainty about state variables that do not aﬀect the ﬁrst-best level of T (e.g. α)
tends to generate substitutability (through the indirect incentive management eﬀect). As noted
above, σ aﬀects the ﬁrst-best level of S but not T, and so both forces are at work: thus, uncer-
tainty about σ has ambiguous implications for the complementarity/substitutability between
rigidity and discretion. Since uncertainty about γ unambiguously pushes toward complemen-
tarity, broadly speaking rigidity and discretion are less likely to be complementary in the case
of production externalities than in the case of consumption externalities.
Next we consider a simple political-economy extension of the model, in which each govern-
ment maximizes a modiﬁed welfare function that attaches an extra weight to domestic proﬁts.
More speciﬁcally, we consider the possibility that each government maximizes an objective
function of the form ˜ W ≡ W +ξ ·Π. We allow for the possibility that both the import demand
level α and the political-economy parameter ξ may be uncertain.
There is a close similarity between this case and the case of production externality considered
above, since the domestic producer surplus is closely related to the domestic output X.T h i s
similarity is reﬂected in the feature that, in both cases, the ﬁrst-best outcome (from the point
of view of the governments’ objectives) entails a price wedge only on the producer side and not
on the consumer side, and therefore the ﬁrst-best level of T is zero and the ﬁrst-best level of S
is positive. But there is also an important diﬀerence: the ﬁrst-best level of S does not depend
on demand and supply parameters in the production externality case (it is equal to σ), but in
the case of political economy considerations the ﬁrst-best level of S is proportional to domestic
output X,a n dt h i sdoes depend on demand and supply parameters. As a consequence, the
ﬁrst-best agreement is {T =0 ; S = S(ξ,α)},w h e r eS(ξ,α) is increasing in both arguments.
Note that this agreement costs 2(2 + k)c.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h e{FB} agreement is contingent on both state variables implies that, be-
tween {FB} and the empty agreement, there is now one more cost class to consider, namely
agreements that cost (4 + k)c, where both policies are contingent on a single state variable (α
or γ). Also, since in this environment α is now relevant for the ﬁrst-best level of S but not T,
both the indirect state-contingency and incentive management eﬀects are present with regard
39to α uncertainty, and so uncertainty over α now has an ambiguous eﬀect on the complemen-
tarity/substitutability between rigidity and discretion. Aside from these diﬀerences, the main
qualitative results are the same as in the case of a production externality.
Finally, we emphasize again the possibility of an escape-clause type agreement {T(α)},
because in this political-economy setting it has a particularly interesting interpretation. The
{FB} agreement dictates that governments practice free trade (T =0 )a n do ﬀer domestic
subsidies contingent on political (ξ) and import demand (α) shocks. But in the presence of
contracting costs, it may be optimal to leave domestic subsidies to discretion, allow governments
to interfere with trade, and permit higher tradeb a r r i e r si nc a s eo fas u r g ei ni m p o r td e m a n d .
7. Conclusion
This paper takes a ﬁrst step in the analysis of trade agreements as endogenously incomplete
contracts. We have shown that an incomplete contracting perspective provides a novel ex-
planation for the emphasis on border measures that has traditionally characterized real world
trade agreements, and provides as well a novel explanation for the appeal of escape clauses in
the presence of uncertain import demand. We have established that the nature of the optimal
agreement in an incomplete contracting setting depends on features of the underlying economic
environment that have simple economic interpretations: the degree of substitutability across
instruments; the extent of monopoly power on world markets; the extent to which discretion
facilitates indirect state-contingency; the extent to which rigidity interferes with indirect incen-
tive management; and the source of uncertainty. Employing these features, we have identiﬁed
conditions under which the two essential methods for saving on contracting costs — introducing
rigidity and/or introducing discretion into the agreement — can be either complements or sub-
stitutes. We have found that the optimal agreement tends to leave less discretion over domestic
instruments when trade volumes are higher. And ﬁn a l l y ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h ea p p e a lo f
some of the more subtle clauses and features of the GATT/WTO, such as its NT provision and
its emphasis on weak bindings, can be understood from the incomplete contracting perspective.
Our model abstracts from some important elements that should be incorporated into a more
complete theory. We conclude with a brief discussion of a number of these elements, and suggest
directions for further research.
We have worked within a two-country setting. This precludes the study of one of the
40foundational provisions of the GATT/WTO, its MFN rule, and by implication precludes as
well the study of its most important exception to the MFN rule under which free trade areas
and customs unions may form. Extending our analysis to a multi-country environment would
permit an exploration of these and related topics.
We have restricted our focus to instrument-based contracts, excluding outcome-based con-
tracts from our analysis. Outcome-based bindings of trade volumes or prices are not emphasized
in real-world trade agreements, and so this is a natural starting point. But there are provisions
of the GATT/WTO (most notably the Non-Violation provision in GATT Article XXIII) that
do have this ﬂavor, and such provisions warrant investigation within an incomplete-contracts
setting, as they are suggestive of attempts to economize on contracting costs.
We have adopted the view that trade agreements serve to provide an escape for governments
from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoner’s Dilemma. An alternative view is that trade agreements
help governments make commitments to their private sectors (e.g., unions or political lobbies).
Under this alternative view, the nature of the ﬁrst-best contract would be quite diﬀerent, and
so naturally the nature of the optimal agreement in an incomplete contracting environment is
likely to be quite diﬀerent as well.
Our formal analysis does not identify an explicit role for a dispute settlement body. But it
is often observed informally that the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO plays an important
role in helping to “complete” the incomplete WTO contract. Our contracting costs are modeled
as a “black box,” but introducing an explicit role for a dispute settlement body into our analysis
would require disentangling contract writing costs from costs of interpreting and enforcing the
contract. This is a diﬃcult task, but it could add an important new dimension to our analysis.
Finally, our paper explains contract incompleteness on the basis of contracting costs, but
other approaches are possible. In the contract-theoretic literature, a common approach is to
assume that there is asymmetric information between the contracting parties and the court,
so that some variables observed by the parties are not “veriﬁable,” and to then characterize
the optimal contract by means of mechanism-design techniques. We can relate this “standard”
approach to the approach taken here with a simple example. Consider our basic model of
section 2 and suppose there is a single uncertain variable, say γ. The standard approach would
be to assume that γ is not veriﬁable, so that the contract cannot be made contingent on γ.A
contract is then a menu of policy combinations (T,S), from which the (importing) government
can choose. With one-dimensional uncertainty, this contract is typically a nonlinear function,
41which we can represent as g(T,S)=0 . Under some conditions, the optimal contract induces
self-selection (separation) of the diﬀerent government “types,” that is, the government chooses
ad i ﬀerent point in the menu depending on the value of γ.
At this point it is easy to see the relationship between the standard approach and the
approach taken in our paper. The key links are two: (1) In the standard approach, the only
impediment to contracting is the nonveriﬁability of γ. In terms of our model, this is analogous
to assuming a prohibitive cost of contracting over γ (e.g. cs = ∞) and zero cost of contracting
over policies (cp =0 ). In this sense, our approach can be seen as more general, since it allows for
a non-prohibitive cost of contracting over state variables, and perhaps even more importantly,
for a positive cost of contracting over policies. (2) The standard approach allows for contracts
that impose general constraints of the form g(T,S)=0 , whereas in the present paper we have
focused on a simpler class of contracts for tractability reasons.
Notice that, as a consequence of the above diﬀerences in assumptions, the predictions are
also very diﬀerent across the two approaches. In particular, the standard approach predicts
that the optimal contract always takes the form g(T,S)=0 ; thus, the optimal contract is never
directly contingent on state variables such as γ, and it always includes all policy instruments,
because contracting over policy instruments is assumed costless.
On balance, then, our modeling of contracting costs is arguably a richer formalization of the
impediments to contracting relative to the standard approach; but this comes at the price of
focusing on a narrower class of contracts. Ideally, one would retain our framework of contracting
costs while allowing for a more general class of contracts of the form g(T,S)=0 ,t h u sa c h i e v i n g
the best of both approaches. We see this as an ambitious avenue for future research.
428. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We ﬁrst argue that conditions (i) and (ii) are both necessary, then we
argue that the two conditions together are suﬃcient. The necessity of condition (i) is obvious.
Consider condition (ii). For ˆ A to be an optimal agreement for some c t h e r em u s tb eav a l u eo f
c such that, for any agreement A0 such that m0 < ˆ m,
Ω( ˆ A) − Ω(A0)
ˆ m − m0 ≥ c (8.1)
and for any agreement A00 such that m00 > ˆ m,
Ω(A00) − Ω( ˆ A)
m00 − ˆ m
≤ c (8.2)
and consequently that
Ω(A00) − Ω( ˆ A)
m00 − ˆ m
≤
Ω( ˆ A) − Ω(A0)
ˆ m − m0
which can be rewritten as (3.1).
To see the suﬃciency part, suppose that ˆ A is optimal in its complexity class and condition
(3.1) holds for all agreements A0,A 00 ∈ A0 such that m0 < ˆ m<m 00. Then there must be a
value of c such that (8.1) holds for all agreements such that m0 < ˆ m, and (8.2) holds for all
agreements such that ˆ m<m 00. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
We will argue that an agreement that constrains only S cannot achieve higher gross global
welfare than the noncooperative equilibrium (TN,SN), for any state of the world. The maximal
gross global welfare that can be achieved by this type of agreement is given by maxS WG(TR(S),S).36
The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem yields TR0(S)=−WG
S /W G
T (the second-order condi-
tion can be shown to hold). This condition requires that the slope of TR(S) be equal to the
slope of an iso-WG curve in (T,S) space. It is direct to verify that TR0(S)=− λ
β+λ.T h es l o p e
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36Since we are focusing on a given state of the world, we do not have to make the state of the world explicit
in the notation.
43Therefore, the slope of the iso-WG curve at the noncooperative equilibrium equals the slope of
TR(S), hence the level of S that maximizes WG(TR(S),S) is given by SN. It follows that an
a g r e e m e n tt h a tc o n s t r a i n so n l yS cannot achieve greater surplus than WG(TR(SN),SN),w h i c h
is just the noncooperative equilibrium surplus WG(TN,SN). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
(i) Let ˜ AS be the optimal agreement in class AS. To prove the claim it suﬃces to show that,
if we replace strong bindings with weak bindings in ˜ AS,g l o b a lw e l f a r eΩ cannot decrease. The
arguments made in this proof are valid whether uncertainty concerns γ or α or both, so we will
generically refer to the “state” to indicate the realization of the uncertain vector. Also, we will
omit the uncertain parameters from the arguments of the relevant functions, as this should not
cause confusion.
Agreement ˜ AS must be one of the following types: (a) {T = T(·)};( b ){T = T(·);S = S(·)};
or (c) {NT;τ =¯ τ;s =¯ s}. A dot in parenthesis means that the constraint may be contingent.
Let us start with case (a). Consider replacing {T = T(·)} with {T ≤ T(·)}.T h i s c a n
decrease Ω only if in some state the government chooses T<T (·) and this implies a lower level
of Ω than T = T(·).B u tT will only be set below the ceiling if the noncooperative import tax
TN is lower than the ceiling, in which case the importing country will set T = TN. Let us show











where we have used the envelope theorem to set d
dT W(T,SR(T)) = WT(T,SR(T)). Clearly
WT < 0 for T>T N.A l s o ,t h es i g no f d
dTW∗(T,SR(T)) i st h es a m ea st h es i g no f d
dT p∗(T,SR(T)).
It is direct to verify that this derivative is negative, which in turn implies d
dTΩ(T,SR(T)) < 0
for T>T N. We can conclude that switching to a weak binding cannot decrease Ω.
Next consider case (b), and consider replacing {T = T(·);S = S(·)} with {T ≤ T(·);S ≤
S(·)}. For a given state, there are four relevant possibilities for how the importing country sets
(T,S) under an agreement {T ≤ T(·);S ≤ S(·)}:
(i) it chooses (T = T(·),S= S(·)): In this case there is of course no change in Ω relative to the
strong-binding agreement.
(ii) it chooses (T = T(·),S = SR(T)):H e r ei tm u s tb et h a tSR(T) is lower than the ceiling.
L e tu se v a l u a t eΩS = WS +W∗
S.Clearly, WS < 0 for S>S R(T),a n dW∗
S < 0, hence ΩS < 0 for
S>S R(T), which in turn implies that switching to weak bindings increases Ω.
44(iii) it chooses (T = TR(S),S= S(·)):H e r ei tm u s tb et h a tTR(S) is below the ceiling. Let us
evaluate ΩT = WT +W∗
T. Since WT < 0 for T>T R(S),a n dW∗
T < 0,i tf o l l o w st h a tΩT < 0 in
this region, which ensures that switching to weak bindings increases Ω.
(iv) the importing country chooses (T = TN,S = SN): The same result can be shown by
combining the arguments we just made for cases (ii) and (iii).
Consequently, a switch from {T = T(·);S = S(·)} to {T ≤ T(·);S ≤ S(·)} cannot decrease Ω.
Finally, consider case (c). Since the NT agreement ﬁxes the wedge q − p∗ and leaves the
wedge p − p∗ discretionary, it is convenient to re-deﬁne variables as follows: p − p∗ ≡ z and
q − p∗ ≡ v. We can think of z and v as the policy instruments and of the NT agreement as
imposing a constraint v =¯ v. Also, it is useful to rewrite the world price as a function of v and
z as p∗ = 1
Υ(α + α∗ − βz − λv).
Let us now replace the agreement {NT;τ =¯ τ;s =¯ s} with {NT,τ ≤ ¯ τ,s ≤ ¯ s}. Using the
new notation, this is equivalent to replacing the constraint v =¯ v with the constraint v ≤ ¯ v.
We can apply a similar argument as for case (a): it suﬃces to show that, for any given state,
Ω(v,zR(v)) is decreasing in v for v>v N (where vN denotes the unilateral optimum for v and











Clearly, Wv < 0 for v>v N.A l s o ,d
dvW∗(v,zR(v)) has the same sign as d
dvp∗(v,zR(v)).I tc a n
be veriﬁed that d
dvp∗(v,zR(v)) = − λ
β+β∗+λ∗ < 0. This implies that switching to weak bindings
cannot decrease Ω.
(ii) To prove this claim it suﬃces to show that there is some conﬁguration of parameters
for which (a) agreement ˜ AS contains some rigid strong bindings, and (b) replacing these with
rigid weak bindings increases Ω strictly. By making cs very high and cp very low we can ensure
condition (a). Next, from the arguments developed above, we know that a suﬃcient condition
for (b) to be satisﬁed is that for some state the noncooperative level of a policy is below the
(rigid) binding for that policy. It is easy to show that there exists a conﬁguration of parameters
for which this is the case.¥
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